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


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SANTIAGO  
DE COMPOSTELA

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COL. ARTHUR L. WAGNER, U. S. A.

REPORT  
OF THE  
Santiago Campaign  
1898

UNIVERSITY OF  
CALIFORNIA.

By  
ARTHUR L. WAGNER  
Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. A.  
Assistant Adjutant-General

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January, 1899



Kansas City, Mo.  
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## PUBLISHER'S NOTICE.

No introduction of Colonel Wagner is necessary. As an author of known reputation on military subjects and as one of the pioneers in promoting professional study in the Army, his name is not only well known in military circles, but to the general public as well. The report herein printed was sent us, with other papers, by his widow for publication, and, though ten years have elapsed since the stirring events described in the report transpired, we take great pleasure in publishing it, not only because of our high regard and friendship for Colonel Wagner, but because it seems to us that the publication will be of great benefit to the Army.

From this report it appears that a Bureau of Military Information in the Field was established by the Commanding General of the Army and placed under charge of Colonel Wagner. Under his instructions Colonel Wagner proceeded to Cuba, but for reasons shown in the report was unable to organize the Bureau or to accomplish any useful work in connection therewith. He then offered his services to

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General Lawton and became a volunteer aid on the latter's staff. In this position he had exceptional opportunities for observing the conduct of the Santiago expedition through all its phases, and has given us a report thereon in his own lucid and inimitable style.

The account begins with the mobilization of the troops at Tampa, follows the naval expedition over the seas to Cuba, describes the landing, the theater of operations, the battles of Las Guasimas, El Caney and San Juan, and the subsequent siege and surrender of the city.

Throughout the report Colonel Wagner comments freely upon the situation from the standpoint of a military critic, and in conclusion gives his views upon various features of the campaign, such as smokeless powder, the artillery, dismounted cavalry, infantry organization, ammunition supply, intrenching tools, uniforms, volunteers, staff and line, signal corps, etc.

We publish his report as a tribute to his memory and for the benefit of his surviving comrades in arms.

June 1, 1908.

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UNIV. OF  
CALIFORNIA

DETAILED IN CHARGE OF A BUREAU OF MILITARY  
INFORMATION IN THE FIELD.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF DAKOTA,  
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA,  
January 15, 1899.

*To Brigadier-General John C. Gilmore, Assistant  
Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.:*

SIR:—In compliance with the verbal orders of the Major-General Commanding, I have the honor to submit the following report on my observations of the military operations in the Province of Santiago de Cuba. A brief preliminary report was submitted by me at Ponce, P. R.; but the preparation of a detailed account of my observations has been delayed, owing to my illness from Cuban fever, which for some months rendered impracticable on my part the labor of preparing an extended report.

---

On the 11th day of June, 1898, I received from the Commanding-General in person the follow-

ing order, which I was enjoined, at the time, to regard as confidential, with the exception that I was to show it to General Shafter, and undertake no duties without his knowledge and consent:

(Confidential)

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
"IN THE FIELD, TAMPA, FLA.,  
"June 11, 1898.

"COLONEL:—On your arrival at Santiago de Cuba you will, as soon as practicable, call upon General Garcia and consult with him in regard to further operations in the Island of Cuba. You will also inform yourself fully as to the strength, condition and character of his forces. You will present this communication to General Shafter at a suitable time in the course of the operations, who will afford you every facility for carrying out my instructions. I desire that you consult him fully in regard to everything pertaining to your duties. Immediately after the capture of Santiago de Cuba or the termination of the operations in that region, you will report at once by cable, and proceed immediately with the officer, interpreter and clerk with you to join my headquarters.

"Very respectfully, NELSON A. MILES,  
*"Major-General, Commanding.*

"To Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur L. Wagner, Assistant Adjutant-General."

I was also enjoined to be extremely careful to avoid in every way anything that might be construed as a recognition by my superiors of the Cuban forces as the army of an independent power or belligerent nation.

Shortly after my departure from Tampa, a bureau of military information at the Headquarters of the Army in the field had been established by the following order, which was communicated to the Commanding-General of the Vth Army Corps:

“HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
“IN THE FIELD, TAMPA, FLA.,  
“June 4, 1898.

“*The Commanding General, Fifth Army Corps:*

“SIR,—The Major-General Commanding the Army directs me to communicate to you the following for your information and guidance:

“A Bureau of Military Information in the Field is hereby established in connection with the Headquarters of the Army, and is placed under the charge of Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur L. Wagner, Assistant Adjutant-General, who will be under the direct orders of the Commanding General.

“The Bureau of Military Information will be charged with the following duties:

“1. The collection and collation of all statistical information in regard to the probable theaters of operations of the Army.

“2. The collection and preparation for ready reference of the Commanding General, of all information relative to the positions and conditions of hostile forces, and the Cuban insurgents.

“3. The conduct of such reconnaissance as may be necessary to carry out the above, excepting such reconnaissance as may be ordered

by the Corps Commanders and other subordinate commanders in accordance with their own functions.

"4. The secret service, embracing the employment of spies and special scouts, guides, interpreters, etc.

"The Bureau will at all times furnish to Corps Commanders all information that may seem to be of value to them, and they in turn are requested to forward to Lieutenant-Colonel Wagner any information which they may deem of value to the Bureau in the exercise of its designated functions.

"Very respectfully,

F. MICHLER,

*"Assistant Adjutant-General."*

My status with the expedition is clearly shown by the instructions set forth above. Under the confidential instructions first mentioned, I was given certain specific duties which were to be performed at the beginning and at the end of the operations. In the meantime I was to perform such duties as might be assigned to me by General Shafter under the order establishing the Bureau of Military Information, and generally to perform any military duty that he might find appropriate to my rank and corps.\*

I was accompanied by my assistant, Captain Edward Anderson, U. S. V. (1st Lieut. 7th U. S. Cav'y.), Mr. Griffith L. Johnson, stenographer, and Rev. A. J. Diaz, interpreter. I was also provided with funds for use in secret service.

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\* See p. 140, where Colonel Wagner states that no use was made of the Bureau of Information except by detailing one of its officers as assistant adjutant-general of a brigade and permitting another to serve as volunteer aid.—*Publisher.*



### THE SANTIAGO EXPEDITION.—LACK OF SYSTEM AND PREPARATION.

The expedition consisted of the Fifth Army Corps, to which was attached a battalion of engineers, a detachment of signal troops, thirteen squadrons of cavalry, four batteries of light artillery, of four guns each, one Hotchkiss mountain battery of four guns, and two batteries of heavy artillery armed with four siege guns, four siege howitzers and eight field mortars. A pneumatic field-gun was manned by a detachment of the 1st U. S. Vol. Cavalry, and there was a Gatling battery of four pieces under charge of Lieutenant Parker, of the Ninth Infantry. The infantry, cavalry and engineers were provided with 500 rounds of ammunition per man, and all the troops were supplied with fourteen days' field and ten days' travel rations, in addition to which sixty days' field rations were taken by the Chief Commissary for issue as circumstances might require. The soldiers were provided with shelter-tents and each carried a blanket-roll.

The transports began arriving at Tampa

early in May, and were, as quickly as possible, put in order to receive supplies and troops. Not only had they to be thoroughly policed and supplied with fuel and water, but it was necessary to fit them with bunks and stalls for the use of the men and animals. Thus, owing to our lack of military preparation, it became necessary to go through the labor and delay of altering all manner of steamers into troop-ships, at a time when celerity of movement was of imperative importance and delay was both dangerous and costly.

There was much confusion and delay in loading the transports. This was due to many causes, chief of which was the fact that the organizations instead of being mobilized (*i. e.*, raised to their full strength, fully supplied and equipped with everything requisite for a campaign) before their concentration at Tampa, were in many, if not most, instances really mobilized only after their concentration. None of the organizations were supplied with suitable clothing for a tropical campaign, but went into the field wearing the same uniform, minus the overcoat, that they would have worn in Montana or northern New York in the winter. Clothing, camp and garrison equipage had to be issued to the various commands after their arrival at Tampa, and the equalizing of the

transportation among the different regiments, the supply of the light batteries, and the completion of the equipment for all the organizations, caused an enormous amount of labor, all of which, under a proper military system, could and would have been done before the troops started for Tampa. Many of the officers of the supply departments were inexperienced; and, though all worked energetically, there was all the friction attendant upon the hurried solution of an important practical problem by untried men. The neglect of the shipping quartermasters to mark on the outside of the cars a list of the stores carried within frequently necessitated an overhauling of a vast quantity of stores in order to find certain needed articles, and added to the general confusion. The congestion of the railroad was a serious drawback, but not an unavoidable one. The private traffic on the railroads of the Plant System could not have been stopped without grave and unnecessary inconvenience to the civil population, but provision should have been made to give the right of way to important military trains and the portion of the road from Tampa to Port Tampa should have been taken under control of the military authorities to the extent of side-tracking all private freight between the two points, and especially the trains of idle

sight-seers, who used the road to the serious detriment of the Army.

The lack of anything like a carefully-thought-out system was everywhere manifest in the embarkation of the expedition. The case was one of emergency and everything was necessarily done in haste; but the haste was not always of the kind that implies speed. The Chief Quartermaster evidently was not given the power, in all cases, to enforce such regulations as he found necessary for the proper and expeditious embarkation of the command; and at least one instance is known of a regiment seizing and holding a transport that had been designated for another. Troops were placed aboard the transports before the loading had been completed, and they were thus kept in a confined position when they would have been more comfortable ashore; and in the meantime they were consuming water which had to be replenished before the expedition sailed. The transports were deficient in quantity and unsuitable in quality; and, as a result, the men were crowded to a degree that, from a hygienic point of view, was simply shocking. If rough weather had been encountered on the passage the distress and sickness resulting from overcrowding would have gone far towards incapacitating the command for the work of an arduous campaign.

But the deficiency of the transports in number and quality is a subject for regret rather than censure. At the beginning of the war the United States did not possess a single troop-ship, and in the necessity of preparing in haste an expedition for the invasion of Cuba, the best use had to be made of the means at hand.

If we are to profit from our experience, we should remember in similar cases in future:

1. An officer with full authority to give orders in the name of the commanding general of the expedition should be charged with the loading of the transports. His authority should in this matter be supreme and beyond question.

2. No troops should be embarked until the completion of the loading of the vessel. Unless circumstances imperatively demand otherwise, none of the troops should be embarked until all the vessels have their load of freight. The troops could then be placed aboard immediately before sailing. If time permits, the men should be practiced in embarking and debarking.

3. The supplies of all kinds immediately necessary for each organization should be on the same vessel with it.

4. A list of the contents of each vessel should be made out by the quartermaster in charge, one copy given to the Commanding General, one retained by the Chief Quarter-

master, and a copy given to the chief of each supply department, so far as it relates to the stores under his charge.

5. If possible, the stores should be so loaded that upon disembarkation it would be practicable to unload completely and promptly one or two vessels so as to have them available for emergency transportation without carrying with them a part of the supplies needed by the command.

6. Every car bringing supplies to the place of embarkation should be marked with a card showing in detail the nature of its contents. All commissary stores in cars and trains should be in the form of complete rations.

7. All companies, either railroad or steamship, engaged in carrying troops in time of war, especially in an emergency, should be made to regard military interests as paramount. Transportation companies, it seems to me, were, during the campaign, treated with a degree of unnecessary consideration, evincing timidity, by the military authorities, which was not always in accordance with the best interests of the Nation.

On the manner in which the command was embarked by Lieutenant-Colonel C. F. Humphrey (now brigadier-general of Volunteers), D.Q.D.G., there can justly be no comment but

praise. The faults existing were in no manner due to him, but were in a great measure overcome by his indefatigable and Herculean labor.

Tampa having been found in many respects undesirable as a point of embarkation, there has been some adverse comment upon its selection. I desire to state that in a *projet* of operations submitted by me before the outbreak of hostilities with Spain, New Orleans, Mobile and Tampa were recommended as points of simultaneous embarkation for troops destined for the invasion of Cuba. The same points were recommended by a joint Military and Naval Board consisting of Captain A. S. Barker, U.S.N., and myself, and later by a board consisting of Lieutenant - Colonel Theodore Schwan (now brigadier - general of Volunteers and colonel), A.A.G., myself, and Major W. H. Carter (now lieutenant-colonel), A.A.G. In each case these three points were recommended as *points for simultaneous embarkation of completely mobilized troops*, not as points of organization and supply. What circumstances demanded the assembling and outfitting of the entire force at Tampa I do not know.

The embarkation of the command was practically completed on the evening of June 8th, the various organizations occupying transports as follows. The number in each case indicates

the number of the transport, which was painted in large white figures on the smokestacks and sides of the vessels.

Organizations and Commanding Officers.	On What Ships.
<b>1st Infantry,</b> Lt.-Col. W. H. Bisbee.	<i>Segurança</i> (12). Regiment.
<b>2d Infantry,</b> Lt.-Col. W. M. Wherry.	<i>Yucatan</i> (8). Hdqrs., Band, Cos. C and G. <i>Clinton</i> (32). Cos. D and B. <i>San Marcos</i> (18). Cos. A, E, F and H.
<b>3d Infantry,</b> Colonel John H. Page.	<i>Breakwater</i> (29). Regiment.
<b>4th Infantry,</b> Lt.-Col. A. H. Bainbridge.	<i>Concho</i> (14). Regiment.
<b>6th Infantry,</b> Lt.-Col. H. C. Egbert.	<i>Miami</i> (1). Regiment.
<b>7th Infantry,</b> Colonel D. W. Benham.	<i>Iroquois</i> (25). Hdqrs., Cos. A, B, C, D and F. <i>D. H. Miller</i> (19). Cos. E, G and H. <i>Comal</i> (7). Co. I.
<b>8th Infantry,</b> Major C. H. Conrad.	<i>Seneca</i> (5). Regiment.
<b>9th Infantry,</b> Lt.-Col. E. P. Ewers.	<i>Santiago</i> (2). Regiment.
<b>10th Infantry,</b> Lt.-Col. E. R. Kellogg.	<i>Alamo</i> (6). Hdqrs., Band, Cos. C, D, E and G. <i>Santiago</i> (2). 1 Battalion.

Organizations and Commanding Officers.	On What Ships.
12th Infantry, Lt.-Col. R. Comba.	<i>Cherokee</i> (4). Regiment.
13th Infantry, Major P. H. Ellis.	<i>Saratoga</i> (20). Regiment.
16th Infantry, Colonel H. A. Theaker.	<i>San Marcos</i> (18). Regiment.
17th Infantry, Lt.-Col. J. T. Haskell..	<i>Cherokee</i> (4). Hdqrs. and 2 Companies.
20th Infantry, Major Wm. S. McCaskey.	<i>Iroquois</i> (25). Cos. C, G, H and K. <i>Manteo</i> (36). 2 Cos.
21st Infantry, Lt.-Col. Chambers McKibbin.	<i>Mattewan</i> (26). Regiment. <i>Saratoga</i> (20). Hdqrs., Band, Cos. C, D, E, H. <i>City of Washington</i> (16). Cos. A, B, F and G.
22d Infantry, Lt.-Col. J. H. Patterson.	<i>Orizaba</i> (24). Regiment. <i>City of Washington</i> (16). Regiment.
24th Infantry, Lt.-Col. E. H. Liscum.	
25th Infantry, Lt.-Col. A. S. Daggett.	<i>Concho</i> (14). Regiment.
2d Mass. Vols., Colonel E. P. Clarke.	<i>Knickerbocker</i> (13). Hdqrs. and 8 Cos. <i>Seneca</i> (5). 2 Cos. <i>Manteo</i> (36). 2 Cos.

Organizations and Commanding Officers.	On What Ships.
7 <sup>th</sup> New York Vols., Lt.-Col. W. A. Downs. 1 <sup>st</sup> Cavalry, Lt.-Col. C. D. Viele. 2 <sup>d</sup> Cavalry, Major W. A. Rafferty.	<i>Vigilancia</i> (23). Regiment. <i>Leona</i> (21). Regiment. <i>Morgan</i> (30). Major Rafferty and Troop C. <i>Mattewan</i> (26). Troops F and D. <i>Stillwater</i> (28). Troop A.
3 <sup>d</sup> Cavalry, Major H. W. Wessels. 6 <sup>th</sup> Cavalry, Lt.-Col. Henry Carroll. 9 <sup>th</sup> Cavalry, Lt.-Col. J. M. Hamilton. 10 <sup>th</sup> Cavalry, Lt.-Col. S. T. Norvell. 1 <sup>st</sup> Vol. Cavalry, Colonel Leonard Wood. Engineer Battalion, Captain E. Burr.	<i>Rio Grande</i> (22). Regiment. <i>Rio Grande</i> (22). Regiment. <i>Miami</i> (1). Regiment. <i>Leona</i> (21). Regiment. <i>Yucatan</i> (8). Regiment. <i>Alamo</i> (6). Battalion (2 Cos.)
Light Arty. Battalion, Major J. W. Dillenback, Captain Allyn Capron, Captain C. L. Best, Captain G. S. Grimes, Captain C. D. Parkhurst.	<i>Berkshire</i> (9). <i>Comal</i> (7). Lt. Batty. E, 1 <sup>st</sup> Arty. <i>Comal</i> (7). Lt. Batty. K, 1 <sup>st</sup> Arty. <i>Berkshire</i> (9). Lt. Batty. A, 2 <sup>d</sup> Arty. <i>Berkshire</i> (9). Lt. Bat. F, 2 <sup>d</sup> Arty.

Organizations and Commanding Officers.	On What Ships.
Siege Arty. Battalion, Captain W. Ennis,	<i>Orizaba</i> (24). Batty. G, 4th Arty.
Captain A. S. Cummins.	<i>Orizaba</i> (24). Batty. H, 4th Arty.
Balloon Signal Detachm't, Major J. E. Maxfield, Major F. Greene.	<i>Rio Grande</i> (22). <i>Segurança</i> (12).

The several divisions and brigades were constituted as follows:

#### *FIRST DIVISION.*

Brigadier-General J. F. Kent.

<i>First Brigade.</i>	<i>Second Brigade.</i>	<i>Third Brigade.</i>
Brig.-Gen. H. S. Hawkins 6th Infantry, 16th Infantry, 71st N. Y. Vols.	Colonel E. P. Pearson. 2d Infantry, 10th Infantry, 21st Infantry.	Colonel C. A. Wikoff. 9th Infantry, 13th Infantry, 24th Infantry.

#### *SECOND DIVISION.*

Brigadier-General H. W. Lawton.

<i>First Brigade.</i>	<i>Second Brigade.</i>	<i>Third Brigade.</i>
Colonel J. J. Van Horne. 8th Infantry, 22d Infantry, 2d Mass. Vols.	Colonel Evan Miles. 1st Infantry, 4th Infantry, 25th Infantry.	Brig.-Gen. A. R. Chaffee. 7th Infantry, 12th Infantry, 17th Infantry.

*CAVALRY DIVISION.\**

Major-General Joseph Wheeler.

<i>First Brigade.</i>	<i>Second Brigade.</i>
Brig.-Gen. S. S. Sumner. 3d Cavalry, 6th Cavalry, 9th Cavalry, 1st Squadron, 2d Cavalry (Mounted).	Brig.-Gen. S. B. M. Young. 1st Cavalry, 10th Cavalry, 1st U. S. Vol. Cavalry.

*INDEPENDENT BRIGADE*

Brigadier-General J. C. Bates.

3d Infantry,	20th Infantry.
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The headquarters of General Shafter were on the *Seguranca*; those of Generals Wheeler, Lawton and Kent were on the *Alleghany*, *Santiago* and *Iroquois* respectively.

The force embarked consisted, in round numbers, of 15,000 enlisted men and 800 officers. There were also about 2,200 horses and mules on the transports. The Cavalry Division was dismounted, with the exception of the squadron of the 2d Cavalry under Major Rafferty.

The expedition was expected to sail on the morning of June 9th; but, owing to a report, communicated officially from the Navy Department, that Spanish war-vessels had been seen in the Nicholas Channel, the departure of the transports was delayed until June 14th. What foundation there was for the report in regard to

Each regiment consisted of two dismounted squadrons, the third having been left at Tampa.—*Publisher.*

the Spanish vessels, I have never been able to ascertain. As the report came officially, the delay was certainly dictated by the most ordinary prudence, as a fleet of transports would in themselves be helpless in the presence of hostile war-vessels, and it would be a difficult matter for the convoy to protect the transports against the assaults of a smaller number of vessels determined to destroy the troop-ships at the risk of their own annihilation. Nevertheless the delay was unfortunate, as time was pressing, the troops in the transports were uncomfortable, and each passing day brought us nearer to the sickly season.

On the 14th of June the fleet of transports sailed. The convoy consisted of the *Annapolis*, *Helena* and *Castine*, which were reinforced at Dry Tortugas by the *Indiana*, *Detroit*, *Panther*, *Yosemite*, *Bancroft*, *Vesuvius*, *Scorpion*, *Wasp*, *Eagle* and *Wampatock*. The fleet sailed in three columns, with intervals of 800 yards, the ships of each column being at a distance of 400 yards from each other. The order of sailing of the war-vessels and transports is shown in the diagram on the following page. The fleet was favored with pleasant weather and a smooth sea, and the expedition arrived off Guantanamo early on the morning of the 20th of June. From this point the *Segurancia* steamed to the fleet of

war-vessels lying off the harbor of Santiago, and Admiral Sampson came aboard to consult with General Shafter. The *Seguranca*, accompanied by the *Gloucester*, steamed to Aserraderos, where General Shafter and Admiral Sampson had a conference with General Garcia at the camp of General Jesus Rabi, of the Cuban Army. In compliance with my orders (already quoted), I went ashore at Aserraderos and consulted General Garcia in regard to the matters mentioned in my instructions. I was received by him with great courtesy, and given full and unreserved information, the essence of which I communicated on the same day by cable to the Major-General Commanding. My first impression of the Cuban soldiers was much more favorable than the opinion formed as the result of later and more extended observation. They were better disciplined and better equipped than I had expected them to be, and their ready obedience of their officers, and their manifest good care of their arms more than neutralized the unfavorable impression created by their ragged attire and general tatterdemalion appearance. It was not until a later date that I discovered that, whatever their merits as bushwhackers might be, they were practically useless in battle.

## ORDER OF CRUISING.


INTERNATIONAL SIGNAL T. C. F.

<b>O</b>	1600 yds.				<b>O</b>
Vesuvius.					Scorpion.
!					!
!					!
1600					1600
!!					!
!					!
<b>O</b>	800	<b>O</b>	800	<b>O</b>	800
Annapolis.		Castine.		Helena.	Indiana.
400				400	
<b>O</b>		<b>O</b>		<b>O</b>	(1st Division.)
Miami.		Berkshire.		Alleghany.	
<b>O</b>		<b>O</b>		<b>O</b>	
Santiago.				San Marcos.	
<b>O</b> —1600—	<b>O</b>	<b>O</b>	<b>O</b>	—1600— <b>O</b>	
Panther.				D. H. Miller.	Yosemite.
<b>O</b>		<b>O</b>	<b>O</b>		
Cherokee.		Segurança.		Saratoga.	
<b>O</b>		<b>O</b>	<b>O</b>		
Seneca.		Iroquois.		Morgan.	
800				800	
<b>O</b>	800	<b>O</b>	800	<b>O</b>	800
Bancroft.		Manning.		Hornet.	Detroit.
400				400	
<b>O</b>		<b>O</b>		<b>O</b>	(2d Division.)
Mattewan.		Stillwater.		Rio Grande.	
<b>O</b>		<b>O</b>	<b>O</b>		
Comal.				Vigilancia.	
<b>O</b> —1600—	<b>O</b>	<b>O</b>	<b>O</b>	—1600— <b>O</b>	
Wompatuck.		Yucatan.		Orizaba.	Eagle.
<b>O</b>		<b>O</b>	<b>O</b>		
<b>O</b>		<b>O</b>	<b>O</b>		
Alamo.			!	Leona.	
<b>O</b> —Naval Ship.		<b>O</b>			
<b>O</b> —Transport.		Wasp.			





# MAP N<sup>o</sup> 1.



## THE MILITARY PROBLEM.

The military problem to be solved by the commander of the expedition can be briefly stated. The Spanish fleet, consisting of four armored cruisers and three torpedo-boat destroyers, was blockaded in the harbor of Santiago by a superior American naval force.\* The harbor is about five miles long, and the city is about four miles from the sea entrance. This entrance is about two miles long and varies in width from one-eighth to five-eighths of a mile. The harbor then gradually widens until at the northern part it is about two miles broad. The entrance was planted with submarine mines and the harbor was defended by the Morro Castle, a stone work partly cut in the rock, having a command of about 180 feet above the sea, and a full command over the opposite shore, which has an elevation of about 60 feet. On the same side of the harbor, and about 340 yards north of Morro was the Estrella battery, having a straight field of fire down the harbor. A quarter of a mile north of Estrella battery was the Santa Catalina battery, and about 1,100 yards further north

\* See Map No. 1.

was the Punta Gorda battery. On the west of the entrance of the harbor, about three-eighths of a mile above the Morro, was the battery of La Socapa. West of the entrance on the open sea front, about two and one-eighth miles from Morro, was the Cabañas battery; while to the east, about one and one-fourth miles from Morro, and also on the open sea front, was the Fortaleza de Aguadores, a fortification quite obsolete. Nothing definite was known in regard to the armament of these batteries, but it was not believed to be formidable. They were, however, of sufficient strength to protect the torpedo field from countermining, and it was not deemed prudent by our Navy to attempt to force the harbor while the mines were still intact, at the risk of a loss of vessels which might reverse the relative strength of the fleets. The military force was therefore to capture the batteries, thus insuring the destruction of the torpedoes, and forcing the Spanish fleet to leave the harbor as the only alternative to being annihilated in it by our own naval force.





### THEATER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.

The theater of the principal military operations in Cuba lies in a valley between the Sierra Maestre and the sea.\* This theater is about twenty miles in length, and varies in width from a mere strip of land at Daiquiri, where a spur of high hills comes down to the sea, to a wide stretch of about seven miles from Aguadores north to El Caney and San Miguel. The region mentioned can be termed a valley only in comparison with the mountainous region which bounds it on the north; for it consists of a series of hilly spurs which form the water-sheds of a number of small rivers emptying into the sea. These streams are the Daiquiri, the Demajayabo, the Juragua, the Guasima and the Aguadores. Though termed "rivers," these streams are mere creeks, ordinarily easily fordable, though at times so swollen by rains as to be serious obstacles. The principal one of these rivers is the Aguadores†, which enters the sea about two and a half miles east of the entrance to Santiago harbor.

\*See Map No. 2.

†The Americans called this the San Juan River, the Aguadores being a tributary, as shown on the map.—*Publisher.*

Ascending this stream about three miles, in a northerly direction, we find it separating into two branches, one of which, known as the San Juan River, extends, almost due north, for about three miles to its source beyond the San Miguel Hill. At a distance of about a mile and a half from its junction with the Aguadores, the San Juan receives the waters of a tributary known as Purgatorio Creek, which extends in a north-westerly direction beyond Cuabitas. About half a mile above the mouth of the Purgatorio, the San Juan receives another affluent, which extends to the northeast, its course lying about a mile west of El Caney. From its junction with the San Juan, the Aguadores extends east about a mile to El Pozo, then in a northeasterly direction for about a mile, where it forks, one branch extending to the northeast and the other to the southeast to their sources, each about two miles above the junction. A little less than half a mile from its junction with the San Juan, the Aguadores receives the waters of Las Guamas Creek, which is often termed the Aguadores River, it being fully as large as the other branch. Las Guamas Creek extends to the northeast a little more than a mile to the vicinity of Marianaje, then extends almost due north to its source beyond El Caney. About a mile above Marianaje

the stream forks, one branch extending to the northeast, and the other north to a point about half a mile south of El Caney, where it again divides, one branch passing to the east and another to the west of the town. The Aguadores, Las Guamas, and San Juan flow through a veritable valley, bounded on the south and west by hills and on the north by foot-hills which rise gradually until they form a part of the Sierra Maestre.

From Siboney a single-track, narrow-gauge railway extended to Santiago, passing along the seashore. A road, known as El Camino Real, passes from Daiquiri over the watershed to Siboney, thence over a similar range to the valley of the Aguadores, and thence over the San Juan hills and another range nearer the city, to Santiago. Another road, leading from Guantanamo, passes several miles to the north of El Camino Real, and enters the theater of operations at El Caney, from which point it leads in a southwesterly direction to Santiago. These two principal roads were poor, especially El Camino Real, whose name would seem to have been given it in a spirit of sarcasm, as it was execrably bad. The other roads in the region considered were such in name only, being generally mere trails

or bridle-paths. The soil is rich and the vegetation is of the rank luxuriance known only in the tropics. In many places it was impossible to penetrate it without using a machete, and it often completely shut out the view of the surrounding landscape.

## THE LANDING.

Small garrisons of Spanish troops were at Daiquiri, Siboney, Sardinero and Aguadores, the main body of the Spanish Army being in Santiago. As a result of the conference with General Garcia, General Shafter decided to effect a landing at Daiquiri, about eighteen miles east of Santiago. From this point the force, pushed forward toward Santiago, could uncover the landing at Siboney, which was then to be used as a second place of debarkation. It was decided that feints should be made at the different points along the coast from Cabañas on the west to Guantanamo on the east. General Demetrio Castillo, who had 500 Cubans a short distance east of Daiquiri, was to be reinforced with 500 more men from Garcia's force, and was to move forward and attack the town in conjunction with the landing of our troops. He was to be in rear of Daiquiri on the morning of the 22d. Five hundred more of Garcia's troops, under General Rabi, were to attack Cabañas; while General Garcia himself, with the remainder of his force, was to remain for the present at

Aserraderos. I have never been able to learn definitely the exact strength of Garcia's army. As first reported by me in cable message to the Major-General Commanding, it amounted to 8,000 men; but I have reason to believe that this very considerably exceeds the real number that Garcia had, and that his command probably never numbered more than 5,000 during the campaign.

The choice of a landing-place was judicious. It would, it is true, have been practicable to land nearer the city, and at a later date, when we had troops on the shore and in contact with the enemy, the choice of Cabañas as a landing-place would doubtless have been better. But in the first instance it was desirable to get all the troops ashore with as little opposition as possible, in order that they might be supplied with rations and ammunition, and that all necessary preliminaries to a determined and sustained advance might be taken. The enemy, of course, labored under the disadvantage which a commander standing on the defensive always incurs—the point of attack being unknown to him, he could not distribute troops at the different landing-places along the shore without incurring the risk of being overwhelmed by superior numbers at some point. A manifest attempt to land at Siboney or Aguadores would

have enabled the Spanish commander to concentrate a considerable number of troops to oppose it, whereas he could not have seriously resisted the landing at Daiquiri without incurring the danger of being cut off by a force landing at Siboney. As to the landing at Aguadores, it would have been practicable for the Spaniards to oppose it with a very considerable force which they could have safely detached at such a short distance from the city; and considerations of supply, of water, camping facilities for the troops, etc., made that point undesirable as a landing-place. According to the plan agreed upon by the military and naval commanders, Cabanás, Aguadores, Siboney and Daiquiri were to be simultaneously bombarded by the Navy, and feints were to be made at each place. The Army was to land in the following order: Second Division, with Gatling detachment, Bates' brigade (reserve for Lawton), Cavalry Division (Wheeler), First Division (Kent), Squadron of 2d Cavalry (Rafferty). In case serious opposition was encountered, the field artillery was to be landed at once; otherwise it was to follow the cavalry squadron. Three days' field rations and 100 rounds of ammunition were issued to each soldier, and 100 rounds of cartridges per man were ordered on shore at once for distribution. On the morning of the 22d, the *Scorpion*, *Vixen* and

*Texas* opened fire at Cabañas; the *Eagle* and *Gloucester* at Aguadores; the *Hornet*, *Helena* and *Bancroft* at Siboney; and the *Detroit*, *Castine*, *Wasp* and *New Orleans* at Daiquiri. It would seem that some provision for proper reconnaissance, and for communication between the fleet and the Cubans on shore, would have obviated the necessity for some of this bombardment. The Spaniards had evacuated Daiquiri about five o'clock in the morning, after setting fire to the wharf and some sheds, and the troops of General Castillo were in possession of it when the bombardment began; but no provision had been made for communication between Castillo and the fleet, and the important information of the abandonment of Daiquiri and its environs were not conveyed to the American commander. After a furious cannonade all along the shore at the points mentioned, which lasted about half an hour, and which is said to have resulted in the loss of one Spaniard, killed at Siboney, and two Cuban soldiers, wounded at Daiquiri, the landing began. So far as Daiquiri was concerned, this bombardment was simply "noise and fury, signifying nothing."

But slight damage had been done to the wharf by the Spaniards, and it was of much assistance in effecting the landing. The wharf was of crib-work, about 40x30 feet, and was con-

nected with the shore by a piled tramway about 150 feet long. There was a small system of water-works at this point, which furnished a considerable supply of pure water for the troops and transports.

The landing was made in small boats belonging to the transports, supplemented with a number borrowed from the Navy. The Navy also furnished some launches, each of which took from four to six boats in tow, and as soon as a signal was given they started for the shore. The landing was effected without much difficulty and with the loss of only two men, who were drowned; but could have been greatly expedited had there been lighters provided beforehand for this purpose. As it was, there was only one lighter with the entire fleet of transports. This was the *Laura*, which was able to carry half a regiment at a time. The *Manteo* and the *Cumberland*, two light-draft steamers, were afterwards utilized as lighters, but, so far as I can learn, they were not employed in the landing. (A large steam lighter, which had been ordered to join the fleet while the expedition was still organizing, had to put into Pensacola for repairs, and never joined. A lighter was lost off Sand Key, Florida, and a tug-boat deserted on the first night out. I do not know how it happened that sufficient lighters were not provided for the

landing of the troops and supplies. It would certainly seem to have been practicable to procure them, and they would have greatly facilitated the landing.) By sunset on the first day the greater part of Lawton's force was landed, and his entire division, with a few troops of Wheeler's command, was placed on shore during the night. No horses or mules had been landed; an oversight which was very unfortunate in the operations immediately following the landing.

COLONEL WAGNER'S SERVICES DECLINED BY  
THE CORPS COMMANDER.—VOLUNTEER  
AID TO GENERAL LAWTON.

It had been my expectation, in view of the orders establishing a Bureau of Military Information in the Field, to have charge of a certain portion of the reconnaissance work at the headquarters of the Corps, but this duty was claimed by the Chief Engineer, General Ludlow, by virtue of Paragraph 1472 of the Army Regulations, and as he was directed by General Shafter to prepare a map of the route from Daiquiri to Santiago, I turned over to him all my notes in regard to Santiago and its vicinity, including all the information that I had been able to gain in regard to the place of landing. In his letter transmitting his report to General Shafter he gave me full credit for the information given and the service rendered. I append (marked "A") a copy of General Ludlow's letter, as I have not seen any reference to it in any subsequent reports.\* Though I was provided with an able assistant, Captain Anderson, with an expert stenographer, with an excellent interpreter,

\* This letter was not submitted to the publisher, but, in lieu thereof, a personal letter from General Ludlow to Colonel Wagner; this letter is printed as an appendix.

and with ample funds to be employed in secret service, I was informed by the Corps Commander that he had nothing for me to do. Not wishing to remain a mere idle spectator, and orders having been given to the effect that no persons except those actually on duty with the troops should be allowed to land from the *Segurancia*, I offered my services, with the permission of General Shafter, as volunteer aid to General Lawton. My offer being immediately accepted, I went ashore with General Lawton, and continued to serve on his staff in the capacity of a volunteer aid until the arrival of the Major-General Commanding the Army, when I at once resumed my duties on the staff of the latter. Captain Anderson, finding himself without occupation on the vessel, requested and obtained permission to go ashore as a member of the fighting force, he being a sharpshooter and provided with a rifle. As soon as I had landed, I was placed by General Lawton in charge of the reconnaissance of the Division, and before nightfall I had reconnoitered some distance beyond a ruined house known as "Demajaybo," about two miles from Siboney, and had ascertained that the enemy was still in that town. During the night Lawton's advance rested a short distance east of Demajaybo. The "Camino Real" was found to be scarcely more than a mere trail.

At many points it had been washed out by the heavy rains; it was rough beyond description, and was bordered on each side by dense tropical undergrowth, which in some places was almost impenetrable. The road was not, however, altogether impracticable for wagons, even before it was improved by the troops, and was no worse, so far as traction was concerned, than many "frontier" roads with which our officers are familiar.

General Lawton's orders on landing were to seize the village of Siboney, take up a strong defensive position there, and hold it in order to cover the landing at that place. On the morning of the 23d I was placed by him in command of his advance guard, with authority to give all necessary orders in his name.

The regiment designated as the advance guard was not ready when it should have been, owing to a delay in preparing breakfast for the men and in providing them with water. Another regiment was accordingly substituted as the advance guard, but this caused some delay, and the march did not begin until fully thirty minutes after the appointed time. This was to me a matter of great vexation, as the advance guard would have been able, had it started at the designated time, to intercept a Spanish battalion, which it could undoubtedly have

defeated. As it was, the retreating battalion passed within sight of a patrol consisting of four men, under Captain Getty, of the 22d Infantry, who sent a messenger back as quickly as possible with the information. As there was not a mounted man in the entire command, from the General down, all movements had to be made on foot, and the hostile battalion was able to escape before the reinforcements, which moved at double time, could be brought up. The village was, however, abandoned by the Spaniards so hastily that they left flying on one of the blockhouses a flag belonging to the Talavera battalion. I ordered this flag pulled down, and it was turned in to me, and by me duly turned over to the Commanding General of the Division. The men who pulled down this flag were Corporals Newman and Boyle and Privates Keyser, Cooley and Houghtaling, all of Company B, 22d Infantry. This was the first flag captured in Cuba, and it was duly forwarded to Washington with a statement to that effect. As I was in command of the advance guard at the capture of Siboney, and as the flag was pulled down by my order and duly turned in by me, I claim the honor of having captured the first Spanish flag that was taken in Cuba.

## LAS GUASIMAS.

As soon as Siboney was occupied, General Lawton immediately carried out his orders by taking up a strong defensive position. No aggressive movement was attempted, nor was it permissible under existing orders. A small force of Cubans, however, under General Demetrio Castillo, pushed forward and attacked the Spanish rear guard near Las Guasimas, about three miles from Siboney. The Cubans were rather roughly handled and lost a number of men wounded, one of them mortally. At 9:20 a. m., the village being completely occupied, and the different brigades of Lawton's division being assigned to their respective positions, the capture of the place was reported to General Shafter. Several hours later General Wheeler arrived at Siboney. In the course of the afternoon he held a conference with General Young, Colonel Wood and General Castillo, at Castillo's house in the village, and made a reconnaissance of the Spanish position at Las Guasimas. I knew personally of the conference and the reconnaissance, and I notified General Lawton that

I believed preparations were being made for an attack by a portion of the Cavalry Division upon the Spanish position. He endeavored to communicate with General Shafter in regard to the matter, but the *Segurancia* was standing a number of miles out from the shore, there was a high sea running, and he was unable to establish communication with the vessel. Young's brigade of Wheeler's division began to arrive at Siboney, from Daiquiri, late in the afternoon. Its march continued during the night, the 1st Cavalry arriving shortly before daylight. Sumner's brigade was left at Daiquiri. On the morning of the 24th General Wheeler pushed forward from Siboney with Young's brigade, consisting of two squadrons of the 1st U. S. Volunteer Cavalry, one squadron of the 10th U. S. Cavalry and one squadron of the 1st U. S. Cavalry. With this command was also a Hotchkiss mountain battery of four guns, under Captain Watson, 10th Cavalry. The regular troops, under the immediate command of General Young, advanced on El Camino Real; the Volunteer Cavalry, under Colonel Wood, advancing by a trail that passes over the hill just west of Siboney. These trails unite at Las Guasimas. They are at no point more than a mile and a half apart, but the intervening country consists of such a dense jungle of tropical vegetation that communication be-

tween the two columns was difficult almost to the degree of impossibility. The plan of attack contemplated that Wood's column should move forward to a point, marked during the reconnaissance, where the two roads are not more than half a mile apart; arrived at this point he was to file to the right and get in touch with the regulars, who were to extend their left for the same purpose. The enemy's position was a strong one, well intrenched, and so situated as to be able to sweep both roads with its fire. The Spaniards were provided with a piece of artillery, which I understand was a rapid-fire gun, but of this I have been unable to obtain accurate information. Wood's column came under fire before it had reached the designated point, and was obliged to advance some distance before it could establish communication with the right column. Young, having reached the designated position, opened fire. The attack was made with great gallantry. After the 10th Cavalry had extended to the left and gotten in touch with the volunteers, the entire line rushed forward to the assault and carried the Spanish position.

Shortly after the firing began at Las Guasimas, a courier rode back in great haste and brought to General Lawton an urgent request from General Wheeler to move up to his assist-

ance. Before this message was received, Lawton had Chaffee's brigade on the march and the others under orders. The 1st Brigade followed the 3d on the Camino Real, and Colonel Miles' brigade was directed to move by a road on the right, which, from the best information that could be obtained, would bring it in a position to strike the Spanish left flank. It is claimed by some that the Spaniards did not abandon their position until they observed this turning movement of Miles' brigade. I do not know whether this is true or not. My belief, from what I have been able to learn, is that the Spaniards were thrown out forcibly by the attack of Young's brigade. Lawton's division arrived on the field just at the close of the action. Many comments were made at the time, and have been repeated since, in regard to the action of the Commanding General of the Cavalry Division in moving forward to attack the Spaniards at Las Guasimas. It is certain that the orders given by the Corps Commander contemplated no such movement. Lawton was to be in advance. He was to be followed by Wheeler, after whom were to come Kent and Bates. It was intended that the entire army should be disembarked and concentrated at Siboney, and that it should be supplied with requisite rations and ammunition before beginning a forward

movement. This plan was disarranged considerably by Wheeler's forward movement. It is to be said, however, in support of the action of the Commander of the Cavalry Division, that he was at the time the senior officer on shore; that the difficulty of communicating with the Corps Commander was so great that an opportunity presenting itself for a successful stroke against the enemy might pass before the conditions could be reported to Corps Headquarters and orders in the case received; and that under the circumstances he might be expected to use his own discretion.

A statement has been made at different times that Wood's column was taken by surprise—practically ambushed—by the Spaniards, and that this was owing to a neglect to provide a suitable advance guard. Such was not the case. Owing to the difficulties of the trail, Wood's column had to march in many places in single file, and in no place could he march on a broad front. Owing to the nature of the undergrowth, it was impossible to use flankers without retarding the advance of the column to a ruinous degree. The advance party and support of the advance guard each moved forward "entire," with suitable distances and preceded by a "point" of four men. This was good tac-

tics, and the only disposition suited to the circumstances.

After the battle Lawton's division established its bivouac at Sevilla, about one mile beyond the battlefield. The 2d and 3d brigades of Kent's division, which had been engaged in making a feint near Cabañas on the 22d, began debarking on the 25th, the 1st Brigade landing the day before, General Hawkins having received orders direct from Corps Headquarters. Young's brigade, of the Cavalry Division, encamped just in rear of Lawton, and was soon joined by Sumner's brigade. Kent's entire division was ashore by the 27th, and encamped just in rear of Wheeler. Corps Headquarters still remained on the *Seguranca*, General Wheeler was placed in command of all the troops at the front, with positive instructions, however, not to bring on an action without orders. On the 22d General Ludlow had been sent to bring Garcia's contingent from Aserraderos. This was accomplished on the 24th, and Garcia's troops proceeded to join the command at the front, his main force bivouacking in rear of Kent's, a detachment being sent to cover Lawton's front.

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NOTE.—The losses of the Americans at Las Guasimas were 1 officer and 15 enlisted men killed, 6 officers and 43 enlisted men wounded. The Spanish official reports claim that 1,500 men with two pieces of artillery took part in the combat at Las Guasimas; of this number, they lost 3 officers and 9 men killed, and 24 men wounded.

**COMMENTS ON THE LANDING.—LACK OF SUPPLIES AFTER LAS GUASIMAS.**

Whatever question there may be in regard to the value or usefulness of the Cuban troops as a portion of the armed force in the Santiago campaign, the measures taken to transport them were unfortunate, to say the least. The vessel that went after them carried with it the Engineer Battalion, whose services would have been of incalculable benefit in repairing the pier at Daiquiri, in constructing a similar work at Siboney, and in repairing the roads. These troops, far from being held back, should have been pushed well to the front, if not in the actual advance of the Army. Not only would their services as engineers have been valuable, but they would have constituted at any time a body of infantry of marked excellence. As it was, however, they proceeded to Aserraderos, where they constructed a pier to facilitate the embarkation of the Cubans, a work of doubtful utility at best, and one which I understand fell down under the weight of the embarking troops, throwing many of them into the water. There was later a feeble

attempt to construct a wharf at Daiquiri, and a small wharf was built at Siboney, which was replaced at a later date by a larger one made by a Michigan volunteer regiment. I have no wish to criticise the engineer operations further than to state actual facts. The exalted reputation of the Engineer Corps and the recognized excellence of its *personnel*, both commissioned and enlisted, certainly justified the Army in expecting greater assistance from it than was actually rendered.

The action at Las Guasimas and the consequent hurrying forward of Lawton's command to the support of Wheeler had a serious effect upon the question of supplies. Such a movement not having been contemplated, no supplies were ready to be sent at once to Las Guasimas, while the troops at that point were in immediate need of rations, and Young's brigade was also in want of a new supply of ammunition. The force at Las Guasimas could have been supplied in two ways. First by withdrawing it to Siboney and carrying out the original orders to hold that point on the defensive until the force should be supplied. Second, by sending supplies forward, in any way possible, to the troops in their new position. The former would have been unwise, as it would have given, both to the enemy and to our own troops, the impression of a retrograde movement after an action, and the moral effect would

have been bad. The second method, therefore, was the only one that could be entertained. As a result there was for some days a serious lack of supplies, though a sufficiency of hard bread, bacon and coffee was sent to keep the troops from actual suffering, and this was soon supplemented with rations of sugar and canned roast beef; the latter, however, being so unpalatable that it was rarely eaten. Such was the lack of medical instruments and supplies that I saw the Chief Surgeon of a Division cut a bullet from the shoulder of a wounded Cuban boy with a pocket knife, and heard him inform a sick officer for whom he had prescribed quinine that there was none on hand. How this lack of such vital essentials as surgical instruments and the most ordinary medicines, in the presence of the enemy, occurred, I do not know. The plain facts are sufficient to imply a bunder somewhere. For a number of days no tobacco was sent forward, and the discomfort endured by the troops in consequence of the failure of this supply was something that can be readily understood by persons who habitually use tobacco, but is beyond the comprehension of those who do not.

Much of the delay in forwarding essential supplies to the command was doubtless due to a want of information as to the location of the various stores in the transports. On June 24th

all regimental quartermasters were ordered to their regiments. They knew where their regimental stores were in the vessels, and would have been able to forward promptly the supplies needed, while they were of very little use at the front until they were provided with transportation. Four empty wagons were all that were sent to the front on the morning of the 24th of June, though the remainder were "set up" and put in use as quickly as possible. It was not until the fifth day after landing that a sufficient supply of ammunition for the Army was ashore. As far as possible, Siboney was used as a depot for subsistence stores and for the landing of reinforcements; Daiquiri being used as a depot for ammunition, forage, land transportation and general supplies.

THE ARMY ADVANCES.—COLONEL WAGNER IS  
DEPRIVED OF HIS AID.—  
RECONNAISSANCE.

On the 26th of June, Lawton moved beyond Sevilla and established his headquarters at a point about five miles from Santiago. He was followed by the other divisions, which retained their relative positions. The light batteries, as soon as they were fitted out, were sent to the front, and, passing Kent's division, encamped near Wheeler. The mounted squadron under Major Rafferty encamped near the light batteries. The 33d Michigan and one battalion of the 34th Michigan Volunteers arrived on this day. My individual duties at this time consisted of reconnaissance work in front of Lawton's division, and inspection of the outposts belonging to the same. This work was undertaken by me voluntarily, as no duty had been assigned to me at General Shafter's headquarters. The Chief Engineer having been assigned at those headquarters to general reconnaissance work, I had given him a list of young officers of my acquaintance, graduates of the Infantry and Cav-

alry School, who were skilled in topographical reconnaissance. I retained two officers (Lieutenant Guy H. B. Smith, 4th Infantry, and Lieutenant David P. Cordray, 17th Infantry) for topographical reconnaissance in Lawton's division. I had understood that my work in reconnaissance, etc., was to be entirely for the information of the Division Commander, and totally independent of any work undertaken in the same line from Corps Headquarters. At the same time that I was conducting this reconnaissance for General Lawton, Major W. D. Beach, U. S. Vol. Engineers (captain, 3d Cavalry), was conducting similar work for General Wheeler. I was surprised to find that the reconnaissance work was soon practically taken out of the hands of the division commanders by an order from Corps Headquarters, which directed that all officers engaged in reconnoitering should submit daily, at 5 o'clock p. m., to Lieutenant-Colonel Derby, Chief Engineer, a report of their observations, accompanied with a map. As I was superior in rank to the Chief Engineer, and was performing the reconnaissance work voluntarily, I declined to place myself under his orders, and, with the approval of the Division Commander, I continued my reconnaissance for the information of the latter alone. The two lieutenants whom I had on duty with me were thereupon

detailed, by orders from Corps Headquarters, to report to Lieutenant-Colonel Derby, for reconnaissance duty under his directions. This step, I understand, was taken without any consultation with the Division Commander. It certainly was taken without any consultation with myself.

On the 28th of June, General Shafter came ashore. On this day General Ludlow, who had been succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel Derby as Chief Engineer, was assigned to the command of the 1st brigade of Lawton's division. Captain Anderson, who was on duty with me by virtue of the authority of the Commanding General of the Army, was taken away from me and detailed as assistant Adjutant-General, on the staff of General Ludlow. This detail was made without any consultation with myself, and without notifying me that it was contemplated. As a result, my topographical reconnaissance was brought to a standstill, but I continued to do duty with the outposts, to perform such reconnaissance as I could make in person, and generally to do the best I could under the difficult circumstances in which I found myself.

On the 29th of June, General Shafter, with his staff, came up to the front, and the headquarters' camp was established alongside of the headquarters of the 2d Division. On the same day Garcia's entire contingent was moved to the

front, and constituted an advanced outpost, as it were, for the Army. Shortly after arriving at the front, General Shafter rode out to inspect the different positions of the command, and to inform himself, by personal observation, of their situation. Owing to his physical condition and the intense heat of the morning, the exertion was more than he was able to endure, and a few hours after his arrival at the front he was suffering from heat-prostration to such an extent as to be utterly helpless, and to fill the minds of those about him with apprehension that the Army was about to be deprived of its commander before coming into serious contact with the enemy. He rallied, however, and before nightfall was able apparently to attend to his duties as usual.

On the 30th of June a general reconnaissance was made of the enemy's position. General Shafter in person rode out as far as El Pozo. General Lawton and General Wheeler were also both engaged in reconnaissance, part of the time together and part of the time separately. With General Lawton were his three brigade commanders, General Breckinridge and his two aids, and myself. The position at El Caney was carefully reconnoitered. About 300 yards west of Shafter's headquarters a road branches to the right nearly north, and goes in the direction of El Caney, about four miles distant. This road

forms with the Guantanamo road and the Camino Real a rude triangle, which is covered with a dense growth of tropical vegetation, threaded here and there by passage-ways known as roads, but which are mere trails. About a mile south of El Caney a trail branches from the road mentioned and leads first west and then northwest, to the Guantanamo road, which it joins about three-quarters of a mile southwest of the village. About half a mile from the point where this trail leaves the main trail, or road first mentioned, a path branches (a little west of north) to El Caney, and passes around a ridge to the south of, and commanding, the village about half a mile distant. The main trail intersects the Guantanamo road about two miles east of the town. About half a mile southeast of the village is a stone fort, about 45 x 35 feet, with walls about eighteen inches thick, on the east, south and west side of which was a trench about three feet deep, the approaches to which were covered by a barb-wire entanglement. About one hundred yards south of the town, on lower ground, was a small wooden blockhouse. At the northwest of the town was a wooden blockhouse, similar, but larger than the one at the south. About one mile northeast of the town, upon the foot-hills of a high ridge, was another wooden blockhouse. At different high points on the

ridge to the north of the main road from El Caney to Santiago were solitary blockhouses, which, from their inaccessible situation, were practically free from attack, which were occupied by lookouts, and from which we could from time to time see heliograph signals flashing.

After reconnoitering the position at El Caney, General Lawton and his party returned to the ford of the Aguadores near Corps Headquarters, and then proceeded west to an abandoned sugar-house known as "El Pozo." After reconnoitering this vicinity, they went north about a mile to a ruined hacienda known as "Marienaje," from which point the party returned to camp. The reconnaissance served to familiarize the brigade commanders with the general features of the terrain on which the operations of the following day against El Caney were to be conducted; but it had not resulted in locating definitely the positions of the Spaniards on all parts of the field. The Ducrot (or Ducoureau) house, which stands out as a prominent landmark near the point where the El Caney-Santiago road crosses the San Juan River, was supposed to be within the enemy's lines, and to be held with a considerable force. A reconnaissance made by myself, on foot, with a small patrol consisting of twelve Cuban soldiers, developed the fact that the Ducrot house was not within the Spanish

lines and that the El Caney-Santiago road was open for some distance beyond that point. In this reconnaissance, which extended about two miles beyond our outposts, more than a mile beyond the most advanced parties of the Cubans, and close to the Spanish position, I was accompanied by Mr. Mendoza, a Cuban gentleman serving as a volunteer aid on the staff of General Lawton. He was of much assistance to me, as the Cuban soldiers demurred against going so far beyond their lines with so small a force, and, being able to talk with them in their own language, he was able to induce them to continue. As a result of this reconnaissance, I was able to give the Division Commander a rough map showing a new trail, until then undiscovered, which was used by General Ludlow in moving up to his position in front of El Caney. General Chaffee had carefully reconnoitered in person the ground over which he was to move on the following morning; and a daring reconnaissance made by him in the evening enabled him to locate definitely the position of the enemy at El Caney. In this reconnaissance he approached so close to the enemy's outposts as to be able to overhear their conversation. But, though Lawton had studied his ground with care and had gained valuable information of the position of the enemy in his front at El Caney, the reconnoiter-

ing of the enemy's position in general was incomplete and unsatisfactory. The reconnaissance in front of El Pozo was not sufficient to locate the enemy's position or to gain a knowledge of the ground over which the troops must move in pushing forward to the attack. This is the more to be regretted for the reason that a proper reconnaissance could have been so easily effected. A half-dozen small patrols, each under the command of an officer—and there were many able young officers who would have been only too glad to undertake the task—directed to push forward until the enemy was touched upon or his position absolutely discovered, would have resulted in gaining information that would have saved an infinitude of trouble on the following day. As it was, only such general view of the country in front of El Pozo was obtained as Moses may be supposed to have gotten of the Promised Land when he viewed it from Mount Pisgah.

## THE PLAN OF BATTLE.

In the afternoon the plan of battle was announced by General Shafter to the division commanders. This plan contemplated the attack upon El Caney at 7 a. m. the following day, by Lawton's division, to which was attached Capron's battery of four guns. As soon as the troops were well engaged at El Caney, the divisions of Wheeler and Kent, with three batteries of light artillery, were to move against the Heights of San Juan in front of El Pozo, the expectation being that El Caney would speedily fall, and that Lawton would then swing around and strike the enemy in the left flank simultaneously with the attack in front. Tactically this plan was as good as any that could have been devised. The faults lay in its execution, and these were, in my opinion, due primarily, and above all, to the lack of proper reconnaissance of the ground west of El Pozo. I understand that the reasons given for the attack upon El Caney were that that place would form a point of support for a Spanish attack upon the right and rear of our troops engaged at San Juan; a consideration not

to be ignored, for El Caney was on the Guantanomo road, was the point of junction of a number of roads coming from the northeast, north and northwest, and Spanish reinforcements were reported *en route* from several points, notably from Holguin. It would consequently be necessary either to mask El Caney with a sufficient force to prevent a sortie by its garrison at a critical moment, or to capture it and thus clear the ground before our main attack should be made. I believed at the time, and I still believe, that these reasons were sound. Knowing that the attack would begin not later than 7 o'clock the following morning, I had no doubt that El Caney would be in our possession by 10 o'clock at the latest. I had underestimated the stubbornness of the Spanish defense and the enormous advantages conferred upon troops in entrenched positions by the use of smokeless powder, but I think my views on the subject were those entertained by every officer who had given the situation any thought, and the belief seemed general that Lawton would make short work of El Caney. During the combined attacks upon the front and flank of the main Spanish position, General Duffield was to push forward from Siboney and make a demonstration, along the railroad, against Aguadores, the object being to hold the Spanish forces at that point and prevent

them from moving against the left flank of the force engaged in the attack on the position of San Juan. Duffield's attack at this point was to be facilitated by a vigorous bombardment of the Spanish works by the Navy. General Duffield was at this time in command at Siboney, General Bates, with his independent brigade, having been ordered to the front.

In the afternoon the Army began to move into position for battle. Lawton was to bivouac in front of El Caney and be ready for the assault early in the morning. Chaffee took up a position to the east of the town, Ludlow on the west, Colonel Miles in reserve near the Ducrot house, expecting eventually to form on Ludlow's right. Garcia moved to the north of El Caney to prevent reinforcements from entering, and to cut off the retreat of the garrison. General Kent and General Sumner (who was now in command of the Cavalry Division, owing to the illness of General Wheeler), preceded by Grimes' battery, were to move to the vicinity of El Pozo; Major Dillenback, with the other two batteries, being in readiness to move at a moment's notice in the morning. Major Rafferty, with the mounted squadron, was to move as soon as the road was clear. Three days' rations were to be issued to all the men, but, for some reason unknown to me, they do not seem to have all been supplied. The

troops were in position by midnight, the Cavalry Division in the vicinity of El Pozo, Grimes about 250 yards to the west of that point, the cavalry being in the rear and around the battery. Kent bivouacked on the Santiago road near Corps Headquarters. The 2d brigade (Pearson) was in the advance, the 3d brigade (Wikoff) next, and the 1st brigade (Hawkins) slightly in rear of Headquarters, with orders to move out early in the morning.

## THE BATTLE BEGINS.—EL CANEY.

The artillery was to open on El Caney\* at 7 o'clock in the morning, but some troops, supposed to be cavalry, moving out from the city in plain view at the northwest of the town, the artillery opened upon them at 6:30, and the battle began. Capron's battery opened fire from position 2,300 yards south of the town. The effect of the cannonade was feeble. There were only four guns in position where twenty-four could have been effectively used. The fact that these guns were supplied with black powder was not in this case to their disadvantage, as they were not opposed by artillery. They were at long rifle-range from the Spanish position, and the enemy's infantry was kept too busy by our own to devote any attention to the artillery. There being many points in the vicinity of the town where artillery preparation was necessary for the infantry assault, the mistake was made of scattering the fire too much, and it was not until a later period of the day that the artillery at this point did any effective work. Grimes'

\* See Map No. 3. This map shows the position of the troops at about 12:30, just before the charge on San Juan Ridge.—*Publisher*

battery opened fire at El Pozo about an hour after the engagement had opened at El Caney, and from the time his battery began its fire, two distinct actions were being waged at the same time, one at El Caney and the other at San Juan. The former engagement will be considered first.

Chaffee's brigade on the right deployed along the Guantanamo road east of the town, the 17th Infantry on the road, the 7th in the center, and the 12th on the left. Ludlow deployed on the west of the town, the 2d Massachusetts on the right, the 1st Battalion of the 22d Infantry in the center, and the 8th Infantry on the left. The 2d Battalion of the 22d Infantry, which had been detached on reconnaissance to the left, was afterwards brought into line on the left of the 8th Infantry. Colonel Miles deployed on Ludlow's right at about 11:30 and came into action about noon, the 25th Infantry on the right, the 4th Infantry on the left connecting with the 2d Massachusetts, the 1st Infantry being in reserve supporting the artillery at the position already mentioned. It had now become evident that the capture of El Caney would be more difficult than had been expected. General Bates' brigade, which had come up from Siboney, was accordingly sent forward to reinforce Lawton, and at this time orders were given to General Sumner, then in front of San Juan, to move forward

and connect with Lawton, who was reported as sorely pressed. Though it was evident that the task before Lawton at El Caney was a serious one, there was no necessity for sending reinforcements, for there was not a single moment during the entire battle of El Caney when the issue of the contest could be regarded as doubtful. Bates arrived about noon, and after crossing the Aguadores River,\* came into action between Miles and Chaffee, the 3d Infantry, on the right, connecting with the 12th, the 20th on the left connecting with the 25th.

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\* Las Guamas Creek.—*Ed.*

### GENERAL LAWTON RECEIVES ORDERS TO BREAK OFF THE ENGAGEMENT AT EL CANEY.

During the progress of the battle, about 1:30 p. m., General Lawton received orders from the Corps Commander to break off the engagement at El Caney, and move to the assistance of Kent and Wheeler at San Juan, who were reported as needing help. This, in my opinion, was the critical moment of the entire day. The troops at El Caney had already been "blooded." Had the attack been broken off, the reasons could not have been explained to the men, they would not have understood their withdrawal, and they would have felt that they had been defeated. The news of their apparent discomfiture at El Caney would have preceded them to San Juan, for such tidings are transmitted with inconceivable rapidity, and though they would have brought to the latter field a physical reinforcement, it would have been more than neutralized by the depressing moral effect of the supposed defeat on our right. I cannot understand why this order was given. Surely if it was necessary to attack El Caney or to mask it in order to prevent an attack

upon our right and rear, it is hard to understand why orders should have been given to withdraw the entire force (which Shafter's order specified) to San Juan without leaving any troops whatever to hold in check the Spanish force which Lawton had been attacking and which would have been emboldened by his withdrawal. Fortunately, the importance and gravity of the situation were fully appreciated by General Lawton, who took upon himself the responsibility of delaying the execution of the order until he could represent the true condition of affairs to the Corps Commander. For this purpose he took with him the aid, Captain J. C. Gilmore, Jr., who brought the order, and riding the lines under a heavy fire, with his entire staff, he pointed out fully the situation, in order that the aid on returning might represent the true situation to General Shafter. In the meantime the artillery had been directed to concentrate its fire upon the stone fort, and it did effective work at last, demolishing large portions of the stone walls, demoralizing the garrison and preparing the way for Chaffee's attack. Before four o'clock the attack had succeeded at all points, and El Caney was in our possession.

NOTE.—The losses of the Americans at El Caney were 4 officers and 77 enlisted men killed, 25 officers and 335 enlisted men wounded. The Spanish official reports state that 1,700 men took part in the combats at San Juan and El Caney; of this number, they lost 50 officers and over 500 men killed and wounded.—*Publisher.*

## SAN JUAN.

Meanwhile the action had been raging fiercely at San Juan. At dawn Hawkins' brigade had moved out and marched to the vicinity of El Pozo, where it was ordered to bivouac in the field awaiting further orders. Grimes' battery opened fire at about 7:30 a. m., and, a short time later, Hawkins received the expected orders and moved forward with his brigade, the 6th Infantry in advance, followed by the 16th Infantry and the 71st New York. In the meantime, the Cavalry Division had moved forward at 7 o'clock, the 1st Brigade in advance, the 6th Cavalry leading, followed by the 3d and 9th.\* The 2d Brigade followed in the order, from front to rear, of the "Rough Riders," the 1st Cavalry and the 10th Cavalry. The 1st Brigade was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Carroll; the 2d Brigade was commanded by Colonel Wood, General Young being absent sick. About three-quarters of a mile from El Pozo, Sumner halted to await orders. After remaining here for near-

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\* The 9th Cavalry squadron was in the lead; the other squadron of this regiment was at Daiquiri.—*Publisher*

ly an hour, under a heavy artillery fire, and within effective rifle-range of the hostile position, he received orders to move to Guamas Creek and hold it. When about half way to the creek he received from Lieutenant-Colonel McClelland, General Shafter's adjutant-general, the orders already mentioned to move by the right flank to assist Lawton. Kent in the meanwhile was moving forward with his remaining brigades, the 3d Brigade in advance, the 13th Infantry leading, followed by the 9th and 24th. Both divisions now found themselves in a totally unknown region, in a tropical jungle so dense that movements were practically limited to the road and the object of the assault could not be seen. General Kent and General Hawkins rode forward to make, under fire, a reconnaissance which should have been made before by others; and, coming in view of the blockhouse known as Fort San Juan, they both decided that it was the key to the enemy's position, and determined to make it the object of their attack. In this reconnaissance they were greatly assisted by Lieutenant Ord, of the 6th Infantry, who climbed a tree in order to obtain a view of the enemy's position. The Spanish position was on a chain of hills about three-eighths of a mile west of the San Juan River and commanding the fords of the Aguadores and San Juan, where these streams

are crossed by the Camino Real. The crest of these hills is about 125 feet above the valley. The eminence known afterwards as Fort San Juan Hill projected, bastion-like, from the main chain, trending back gradually on the south, but bending almost at a right angle at the north, and then making a similar turn and continuing to the north in a height known as San Juan Hill. In front of this hill, its slope touching the San Juan River, is another height, known later as Kettle Hill, or Sugar-House Hill. Between Kettle Hill and San Juan Hill was a large pond, which formed a serious obstacle to the advance of troops against the position. The chain of heights is irregular and not easily described; but the three hills mentioned were the principal features of the battle-field. On all these hills were trenches covered with barb-wire entanglements; and on the most southerly one, and giving its name to it, was a loopholed block-house, known as Fort San Juan. The nature of the position was, at the time, absolutely unknown to the advancing troops, and it was a veritable *terra incognita* even to those in command. The troops pushed along blindly, not knowing where they were going, and, owing to the lack of intelligent orders regulating the march, the road was distressingly crowded. General Kent had been ordered to give the cavalry the right of way, but,

owing to the delay caused by the "tailing out" of the Cavalry Division in moving along the narrow road and crossing at unknown fords, he felt compelled to push on, and the road was now blocked by the parallel columns of the infantry and cavalry divisions moving along a narrow road scarcely suited to the rapid movement of a single battalion. This condition was greatly aggravated and "confusion worse confounded" was caused by a captive balloon with its detachment pushing down the road, and marking distinctly the advance of our troops, upon whom and the balloon the enemy now opened a heavy fire of shrapnel and musketry. Under this fire the balloon was soon punctured, and it descended to the ground, to the infinite satisfaction of every one, except perhaps the officers occupying it, for the fire which it had drawn upon the column is estimated to have caused a loss of from sixty to one hundred men. The sole result of this remarkable balloon reconnaissance was the discovery of a trail leading to the left, which might, and should, have been discovered by the reconnaissance of a single small patrol, and which would have been speedily found by the advancing troops themselves. For the first time in military history a balloon was seen practically on the skirmish line, and it will probably be the last time that such an exploit will be witnessed.

It is hard to understand what fantastic conception of the art of war could have caused such a reconnaissance to be seriously contemplated in the first place.

General Hawkins moved the 6th Infantry forward, the 16th following to form on its left. It was expected that these two regiments would flank the enemy's position, and it was intended in the meantime to place the 71st New York between the 6th Infantry and the Cavalry Division to make a frontal demonstration. But the New York regiment had been deflected by General Kent along the trail to the left already mentioned, with a view to forming it in its position on the left of the brigade. It was found, however, that when the 6th and 16th regiments of infantry had deployed, they did not flank the enemy's position, but were in front of it, and under such a heavy fire that an attack was necessary as the only alternative to a retreat. They were accordingly directed to assault the enemy's position, which they did successfully, and with a degree of gallantry that will ever cast a luster over the Regular Army.\* In the meantime, the 71st New York, coming under a heavy fire, became demoralized, and refused to move forward.

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\*The assault at this time was made by the whole line, the left of the dismounted cavalry joining the right of the infantry in the attack upon the San Juan Block-House. The center and right of the cavalry first carried Kettle Hill and then pushed on to the heights in their front.—*Ed.*

Many of the men broke in panic to the rear, General Kent and his staff officers forming a cordon for the purpose of stopping them. Finding that it was impossible to get this regiment as a body to move forward, he ordered them to lie down in the thicket, so as to clear the way for the troops in the rear. The 3d Brigade, advancing rapidly, marched over the prostrate forms of the 71st New York in the order already mentioned, the 13th in the lead, followed by the 9th and 24th. As soon as it was possible for the brigade to deploy, the 13th Infantry formed line, the 1st battalion of the 24th forming on its left, the 1st battalion of the 9th on the left of the 1st battalion of the 24th, the 2d battalion of the latter regiment forming the extreme left of the line, and the 2d battalion of the 9th being in rear of the 13th. This alteration of the battalions of these two regiments was due to the difficulties of the terrain and the confusion incident to the blocked roads. Whether the 2d battalion of the 9th Infantry was purposely placed in the rear of the 13th or not, I have been unable to ascertain. As soon as the 3d Brigade was deployed it was pushed forward to the assault, and it gallantly carried the enemy's position, which it reached almost simultaneously with the 6th and 16th Regiments. Colonel Wikoff, having been killed, was succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel Worth,

who was almost immediately wounded, succeeded in turn by Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum. Liscum was soon wounded, and the command devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers, who did not know that he was in command of the brigade until the hostile position had been carried. As soon as the enemy's position had been captured, the order of the brigade was rectified, the 24th Infantry being placed on the right, the 9th in the center, and the 13th on the left. The time of the capture of Fort San Juan Hill is given variously by different officers, but was probably made about 1:30 p. m.

While Kent was thus engaged, the Cavalry Division had not been idle. The 1st Brigade had succeeded in deploying to the right of the road, the 9th Cavalry on the right, the 6th Cavalry in the center, and the 3d Cavalry on the left, its left flank resting on the road. The 2d Brigade had been cut in two by the balloon detachment, and the leading regiment, the Rough Riders, which had become separated some distance from those in its rear, had marched about half a mile by the flank, passing the 1st Brigade, the movement being undertaken in compliance with the hazy orders to establish connection with, and lend assistance to, Lawton. This movement to the right was soon abandoned, however, and the 1st and 10th Cavalry were

placed in rear of the 1st Brigade and supported by the Rough Riders. The enemy's lines at Kettle Hill were then gallantly stormed by the Division, the 2d Brigade pushing through and uniting with the 1st, the two brigades and the different regiments composing them mingled together in the assault. The assault was made over extremely unfavorable terrain. The division deployed about 800 yards from the enemy, and with the exception of a belt of tropical forest about 150 yards on each side of the river, the ground, from the place of deployment to the hostile position, was open and completely fire-swept; the only obstacles being barb-wire fences, which seriously impeded the advance of the troops while affording them no shelter. Kettle Hill was carried by the cavalry about the same time that Fort San Juan Hill was carried by the infantry.\* The Cavalry Division then moved forward from Kettle Hill and carried the main position† at San Juan at about 2:30 in the afternoon, being supported by the 13th Infantry, which in response to a call for assistance had been sent over from Kent's division. The 13th Infantry remained with the Cavalry Division until the following day. As soon as the enemy's position had been carried, the troops immedi-

\* See foot-note page 82.

† That portion of the San Juan Heights north of the El Pozo-Santiago road.—*Ed.*

ately proceeded to shelter themselves as best they might in the captured intrenchments, upon which a heavy fire was poured from the enemy's main position in front of Santiago. In the assaults on Kettle Hill and San Juan Hill, the courage and energy of Colonel Roosevelt, of the Rough Riders, were so conspicuous as to command general admiration. There is no doubt that to the influence of his personal qualities the successful issue of the attack was largely due. With characteristic energy and gallantry, General Wheeler, who was sick when the battle began, rose from his bed, and resumed command of the Cavalry Division before the close of the action.

The 2d Brigade of Kent's division, under Pearson, which had been under a severe artillery fire since noon, came into action about 2:30 p. m., the 10th and 2d Infantry being directed to the left to follow the 3d Brigade, while the 21st moved along the main road to support Hawkins. The 21st advanced to the hill, where it formed on the left of Hawkins' brigade, and immediately entered the action. In the meantime Pearson endeavored to deploy his remaining regiments to cross the stream and attack in line. But, finding this was impracticable, he crossed in column, deployed on the left of the troops already in action, the 10th Infantry on

the right, the 2d on the left, and in a gallant charge drove back the enemy in his front.

In the battles of the 1st of July the part played by the artillery was very disappointing to the Army. As soon as Grimes' battery had opened fire its smoke at once rendered it a plain target for the enemy, and at the same time obscured its own aim. At the end of three-quarters of an hour its fire ceased. Shortly after noon the batteries of Best and Parkhurst were brought up and formed on Grimes' left, and the artillery was again in action at intervals until the advance of our infantry up the slopes leading to the enemy's position rendered it necessary to suspend the fire of our batteries. About 2 o'clock p. m., Best's battery went to the front and took position on the firing-line; but as soon as it had come into action it received such a concentrated fire from the hostile infantry and artillery that it was quickly compelled to withdraw. It first withdrew down the slope, and then to the position at El Pozo. The services of the Gatling battery were conspicuous and of great value. This battery consisted of four Gatlings, cal. .30. It was unable to come into action until about 1:15 p. m., when its commander, who had with difficulty pushed through the crowded road, crossed the ford and came into position with three guns, at a range of about 700 yards from

the Spanish position. One gun had been detached under the orders of Lieutenant Miley, A.D.C., and was not returned to the battery until about 5 p. m. A very effective rain of bullets was kept up by the Gatlings against Fort San Juan,\* until the advance of our infantry up the slope necessitated a cessation of the fire. As soon as the position had been carried, the Gatling battery went to the support of the Cavalry Division and lent valuable assistance in the capture of San Juan Hill.† It remained with the cavalry till the close of the action, being reinforced, about 5 p. m., by the gun that had been withdrawn, and which had in the meantime been idle. The firing continued along the lines until about 7:30 p. m. The troops were now in position along the captured ridge about a mile and a half from Santiago.

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\* San Juan Block-House.—*Publisher.*

† That part of San Juan Hill, or San Juan Heights, north of the El Pozo-Santiago road. The Gatling guns did not join the cavalry until later in the afternoon, after the Heights had been captured.—*Publisher.*

**Note.**—The losses of the Americans at San Juan, July 1-3, were 15 officers and 127 enlisted men killed, 69 officers and 945 enlisted men wounded.—*Publisher.*

**DEMONSTRATION AGAINST AGUADORES.**

In the meantime General Duffield had conducted the demonstration ordered against the Spanish position at Aguadores, his command, consisting of the 33d Michigan, moving along the line of the railroad. The terrain in the vicinity of the Aguadores River is exceedingly difficult. The only practicable route is afforded by the railroad, which, on approaching the river, passes through a steep defile formed by a high hill on the north and a lower hill on the south, the latter terminating on the side of the sea in a narrow beach. Before entering the sea the river expands into a lagoon, fringed seawards with low rocks. The railroad bridge extends partly across the lagoon and partly over the sandy beach, the river entering the lagoon some distance above. The bridge is about 700 yards in length and was intact until the 30th, when the Spaniards blew up about 40 feet of the structure at the west end. The lagoon affords a serious obstacle, but it was not at the time unfordable. The Spaniards were located in rifle-pits on the west bank, on each side of the bridge, where they

could await in confidence the attack of a vastly greater force in their front, but were seriously exposed to a fire from the Navy. General Duffield entrained the 1st battalion and part of the 2d battalion of the 33d Michigan at 3:30 a. m., moving forward by rail to a point about a mile and a half from the bridge. Here the troops were detrained, and the cars were sent back for the remainder of the command. At 9:30 a. m. part of the troops were deployed and opened fire. The command halted at the extremity of the bridge, and no serious attempt was made to cross—perhaps none was contemplated. The fire of the Spaniards was kept down by the Navy, and the demonstration continued until about 3 p. m., when the command was again placed on the cars and withdrawn to Siboney, where it arrived about 6 p. m. This demonstration is supposed to have fulfilled the object of keeping the Spaniards in position, but the force of the enemy at that point was so small that they probably could not have accomplished anything had they been withdrawn from our front. The operation was generally regarded as a failure, though its success seems to have been problematical from the first. If Duffield's command could have been landed on the west bank of the river, it could have taken the enemy in flank, and doubtlessoulds c have effected important results.

The landing on the west side would, however, have been extremely difficult because of the rocky coast, and though the enemy could have been driven from his entrenchments by the Navy, the fire of the vessels would have necessarily ceased before our troops could have moved to the assault, and it is by no means certain that the attack could have been successfully carried out. At any rate, it would have been exceedingly difficult, considering the nature of the raw troops with which the demonstration was conducted.

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My report of the battle of El Caney is based mainly upon my own personal observation. I was with General Lawton at 4 a. m. on July 1st, and remained with him throughout the entire engagement, except when detached by his orders in my capacity as volunteer aid. General J. C. Breckinridge, Inspector-General, U. S. Army, was also with General Lawton, and though I do not feel that it lies within my province to make any report in regard to officers who are my superiors in rank, I cannot refrain from expressing my admiration for the bearing of General Breckinridge in battle, where he seemed to seek danger with an ardor characteristic rather of a young soldier than of one who had grown gray in military service and had long been familiar with war. The personal example of an officer of his rank

voluntarily in the perils of battle, upon that day, and upon subsequent occasions, undoubtedly produced a good effect upon the troops. My report of the battle of San Juan is based upon information obtained from officers who participated in it.

Just before the final capture of El Caney, the demand for assistance being urgent, General Bates, after a conference with General Chaffee, withdrew his men, in compliance with orders, and went to take a position on the left of Kent. He arrived on the line about 2:30 a. m., his command having been marching and fighting steadily more than twenty-four hours.

**AFTER THE BATTLE.—GENERAL LAWTON'S  
MARCH TO SAN JUAN.**

General Lawton received orders to move as soon as possible, after capturing El Caney, and take a position, on the Santiago road, on the extreme right, joining Sumner. He began his march immediately after the battle, and halted sometime after dark, near the Ducrot house. His division had been engaged all day, and evidently could not have received the three days' full rations contemplated before the battle began, as many of the men were without food, and after their extremely fatiguing day many of them, to my knowledge, sought to appease their hunger by eating unripe mangoes which they plucked from the trees. After the command had gone into bivouac near the Ducrot house, General Lawton with his staff started out to locate the position which he was to take up. He had been informed that if he would go out to the front, he would meet there a staff officer who would direct him to the position that he was to take. Riding along with his staff in the moonlight, he suddenly encountered the fire

of a Spanish outpost, and was compelled to withdraw. Returning to his command, he sent out a strong patrol of Cubans to reconnoiter. The staff-officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Derby, also went out to the front, and, presumably in order to indicate his whereabouts to General Lawton, began singing "John Brown's Body" in a loud voice. He was soon fired upon by the Spanish picket, and left the vicinity. He was not seen by General Lawton until the following morning. This certainly was a novel incident in military history, and I doubt if another case can be found where a division commander has been expected to ride out beyond his own lines in order to find a staff officer to direct his further movements. Whether Lieutenant-Colonel Derby was fired upon before or after General Lawton and his staff encountered the Spanish outpost, I have never been able to ascertain. It has been frequently reported that General Lawton's *command* was fired upon by the Spaniards on their right. The plain facts of the case are exactly as I have stated them. General Lawton and his staff, moving forward for the purpose mentioned, were fired upon and compelled to withdraw. About 2:30 a. m., no report from the Cubans having been received, General Lawton again started out on a reconnaissance, but was overtaken by orders to withdraw, by way of the artillery position

near El Caney and the Corps Headquarters, and thence to cross the San Juan River in rear of Wheeler's division and form on the right of the latter. He began his march at once, reached the San Juan River at daylight, and about noon his command, greatly fatigued, having been marching and fighting nearly thirty hours on light rations, reached a position which it could have taken up by a march straight to the front, not more than 600 yards from its bivouac near the Ducrot house. I have never been able to understand the cause for this movement, nor has anybody who was in a position to know ever explained it to me. It seems to have been undertaken from a fear of a heavy attack on Lawton's right. In view of the fact that the Spaniards had been driven by force from all the positions which they occupied, that they were undoubtedly in the demoralized condition of a defeated army, that they had been engaged all day in a serious battle, it was hardly to be expected that their *morale* would be sufficient to enable them, after their disastrous defensive fight, to assume vigorous, offensive operations in the night. It seems strange that the movement should have been ordered before Lawton could ascertain definitely, by a reconnaissance, the strength and location of the hostile force on his right.

The 34th Michigan and 9th Massachusetts arrived at Siboney on the 1st of July and were ordered at once to the front. Their landing was completed in the afternoon, and, after a night march extremely trying to new troops, they arrived at the captured position at 8 a. m., where they were placed in support of Bates on the extreme left. General Duffield was directed to keep the 33d Michigan at Siboney and to continue the demonstration against Aguadores the next day should it be necessary. During the night Major Dillenback moved his batteries forward to San Juan Hill, where gun-pits were constructed. Four six-mule-wagon-loads of picks and shovels had been brought up by Lieutenant-Colonel Derby during the night, by means of which the troops strengthened their position.

Owing to illness, resulting from fatigue and heat-prostration, General Shafter was unable, on the 1st of July, to exercise the influence on the course of the battle that a commanding general is ordinarily expected to exert. Early in the day he took his position on a high hill near his headquarters in order to get a better view of the field; but, unfortunately, the nature of the country was such that an unobstructed view could not be obtained, nor, owing to the general use of smokeless powder by the two contending armies, could the course of the battle be traced

by the lines of smoke, as might have been done a few years ago. In the afternoon he rode to El Pozo, but, owing to his illness, was compelled to return to his headquarters. His physical infirmity thus prevented him from being present with the troops, and the peculiar topography of the country rendered it impossible for him to gain speedy information in regard to the condition of affairs at the front. As a result, his aids were compelled in some cases to give important orders on their own responsibility; the subordinate commanders were in many instances compelled to act upon their own initiative; and the confusion was greatly heightened by the lack of knowledge of the terrain over which they were operating, and also by the fact that the brigades and divisions were but newly organized, and had had no experience in operating together. Situated as they were in a dense jungle, receiving a heavy fire from an enemy whom they could not see, the troops were in a situation to which I can find no parallel, save, perhaps, that of Braddock's command at the battle of Monongahela. With less resolute and efficient troops and less able and determined subordinate commanders, the battle at San Juan might have terminated as disastrously as the famous battle mentioned.

### JULY 2D.—THE “NIGHT ATTACK.”—SHALL THE ARMY RETREAT?

On the 2d of July the Spaniards opened fire from their trenches near the city, and the action was continued the greater part of the day. As already stated, Lawton was in position at noon. Garcia was placed on his extreme right. About 3 o'clock p. m., the 34th Michigan was ordered to support Kent's division in the center, but was not actively engaged. The 9th Massachusetts remained with Bates. In the morning Dillenback, encountering a heavy fire, drawn upon him by the smoke from his batteries, fell back to El Pozo, and later in the day the batteries were pushed forward to the front and left of that place. At 10 p. m. occurred what is known as the “Spanish night attack.” This consisted of a heavy fusillade from the opposing lines, and lasted about an hour. I do not think the enemy made any attack at all. I have been unable to find any person who saw any hostile troops moving forward from their trenches. The fire probably began by accident from one army or the other, and was taken up all along the line on both

sides. The Spaniards suffered very heavily as a result of this engagement, and, as I have since learned, many of them retreated into the city in a condition of panic. On this day the demonstration against Aguadores was continued by a battalion of the 33d Michigan.

On the evening of the 2d of July a council of war was held by General Shafter, and the question of a retreat was considered. What conditions or representations caused the idea of a retrograde movement to be entertained by the Corps Commander, I do not know. I do know, however, that the *morale* of the troops at the time was excellent, and that as late as the 10th of July the rumor that a retreat had been contemplated on the evening of the 2d was generally received with incredulity by the officers in the trenches.


### A TRUCE.

On the 3d of July, Cervera's fleet left the harbor, and in the engagement which followed it was entirely destroyed. On land desultory firing was continued until about 10 a. m., when General Shafter summoned the Spanish commander to surrender. During the correspondence a truce was agreed upon and all firing ceased. On this day General Escario entered Santiago with 2,800 Spanish troops, having made a brilliant march from Manzanillo, for the purpose of coming to the assistance of his beleaguered comrades at Santiago.

On the night of the 4th and the morning of the 5th of July several thousand non-combatants, mostly women, children and old men, who had been expelled from the city by the Spanish commandant, in view of a threatened bombardment, came out from Santiago and passed through our lines, with the consent of General Shafter. For a number of days this exodus continued, until the refugees amounted to about 20,000. Most of them gathered at El Caney, but some went to Siboney and Daiquiri. As far



**MAP N<sup>o</sup> 3**




**SANTIAGO**

**SAN JUAN - CANEY**

**JULY 1<sup>st</sup>, 1888**

12:30 P.M.





## THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN

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as possible, they were provided with food from the commissary stores of the Army, though the Chief Commissary was already heavily taxed to supply rations to the troops in the trenches. Yellow fever, which soon made its appearance among the troops, was probably introduced by these refugees.

Negotiations relative to the surrender of Santiago and its garrison continuing, the truce was extended from time to time until the 10th of July. During the truce the 6th and 16th Infantry were detached from Kent's division and assigned to Lawton. The 8th Ohio, the 1st D. C. and the 1st Illinois regiments of volunteers arrived, the two latter being assigned to Lawton and being placed on the right of Wheeler. Lawton continued to extend his lines to the right, and several field mortars were placed in position. During the truce the Spaniards were also intrenching, and their position was much stronger and would have been much more difficult to carry by assault at the expiration of the truce than when the negotiations first began. About 4 p. m., on the 10th of July, the truce expired, and a heavy fire of artillery and musketry was opened all along the line.\* This firing continued until nearly dark, the casualties, however,

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\*For the general position of the troops at this time, see Map No. 3.

TO VICTORY  
ARMED FOR LIBERTY

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## THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

being but slight upon our side. On this occasion the batteries of Capron and Parkhurst (the latter under Lieutenant Hinds, Captain Parkhurst having been wounded) were in the trenches with Lawton's infantry and did excellent work. The remaining batteries, under Major Dillenback, were in position to the left and front of El Pozo, a mile in rear of the infantry, much to the dissatisfaction of the troops in the trenches, who were only from 600 to 800 yards from the enemy's works. Desultory firing was continued on the following day until negotiations were again opened, and everything again became quiet along the lines. General Randolph, Chief of Artillery, had arrived on the 9th, and Taylor's and Riley's field batteries were hurried up to the line. Ludlow's brigade was moved around to the right, and the investment of the city was practically complete on the twelfth.

On the 11th of July, Major-General Nelson A. Miles, commanding the Army, arrived at Siboney, and reached Shafter's headquarters the following day. The influence of the Commanding General was immediately felt. The *morale* of the troops rose appreciably, and all felt that matters would soon be brought to a decisive issue. The negotiations for the surrender were pushed, and preparations were made to carry the Spanish lines by assault in case the

negotiations should fail. Before coming ashore, General Miles had arranged with the Navy to co-operate in effecting a landing at Cabañas, of the troops that had accompanied him on the transports *Yale* and *Columbia*, consisting of the 6th Massachusetts, the 6th Illinois, and four regular batteries of light artillery. Other troops, whose arrival was soon expected, were to be landed at the same point. But these measures proved unnecessary, though the presence of the Commanding General and his vigorous preparations, of which the enemy was aware, certainly hastened the satisfactory termination of the negotiations. On the 13th, General Miles and General Shafter went beyond the lines and had a conference with General Toral, the Spanish commander. The terms of the surrender were definitely settled on the 14th, and General Miles at once returned to Siboney and started almost immediately for Porto Rico. I had been at the front from the time of the landing of the first troops until the morning of the 6th of July, when I went back to Corps Headquarters, where I was ill with fever until the evening of the 9th. On the morning of the 10th I again went to the front and was present in the engagements of the 10th and 11th of July. Upon my application, Captain Anderson was returned to duty with me, though not until the 9th of July. While he was

with me in Cuba, and subsequently in Porto Rico, his services were invariably characterized by thoroughness, faithfulness, ability and courage. On the 12th of July, I reported to the Major-General Commanding the Army, and resumed my functions as a member of his staff. My personal observation of the Santiago campaign ended with the departure of the expedition for Porto Rico.

## GENERAL COMMENTS.

I have already stated that the plan of the battle was, in my opinion, tactically sound, but that the faults were those of execution, and that these resulted primarily from the lack of proper reconnaissance. It was certainly good tactics to combine a front and flank attack, and had these attacks been so timed as to be made simultaneously, there is no doubt that the Spanish position would have been carried without great difficulty and certainly without serious loss. Owing, however, to an ignorance of the location of the Spanish lines, the divisions of Kent and Wheeler were moved forward to await the result of Lawton's attack in a position where they were under fire not only of artillery, but of infantry. It is impossible to suppose that the location of the Spanish position could have been known, for no commander would deliberately require, or expect, troops to remain inactive in a position where they were subjected to heavy loss. As things really were, an attack was the only alternative to a retreat, and, to the everlasting credit of our troops, they took the bull

by the horns and moved forward to an attack as gallant as any recorded in the annals of warfare. The task before them was an extremely difficult one. They were required to make a front attack upon an intrenched position, being entirely unaided by the artillery preparation that infantry has a right to expect as a preliminary to such an assault. The attack was rendered all the more difficult because of the new conditions resulting from the use of smokeless powder, which gave the enemy an unobstructed aid and a clear view of the movements of our troops. When the hostile position was carried, our Army was practically without reserves; all the troops being required in the assault.

The Spanish force at El Caney, as nearly as I have been able to ascertain, consisted of 550 men, under the command of General Vara del Rey, who was killed in the battle. I have heard surprise expressed that so stubborn a defense could be conducted against such numerical odds; but there is nothing in the warfare of the past to justify such surprise. More than twenty years ago the view was entertained by some of the best tactical authorities that, with opposing forces equal in arms and *morale*, a successful *front* assault upon a well-intrenched position would require odds of 6 to 1 in favor of the assailants, even with the aid of an effective artil-

lery. In the battle of Woerth, in the Franco-German War, the intrenched position of Froeschweiler, held by less than a division of French troops, could not be carried until the Germans had thrown against it the entire 5th Corps, and the greater part of the 11th Corps, in a combined front and flank attack, though the assault had been prepared by a vigorous and effective fire of 84 guns, of the best artillery in the world, from the opposing heights of Dieffenbach. At El Caney the artillery preparation for the attack was feeble, and the position had to be carried by the infantry with very little assistance from its "indispensable companion." Moreover, the Mauser rifle of the Spanish infantry at El Caney was immeasurably superior to the Chassepot of the French infantry at Woerth, the latter arm being indeed greatly inferior to the Springfield; and, above all, smokeless powder had now conferred upon the defense an advantage before unknown. The Spanish positions at San Juan and El Caney were, in reality, advance posts of the main lines near the city. The former was open to reinforcement at any time from the main lines; the latter was cut off, and had to depend solely upon its own garrison. I have not been able to ascertain definitely the strength of the enemy at San Juan. The least estimate upon which any reliance can be placed gives the Span-

ish force on this part of the field at 750 men with 2 mountain guns. The entire force in Santiago at the time is reliably given as 6,000 men, of which number 2,500 soldiers and 1,000 sailors and marines were in the portion of the main lines east of the city. As it is scarcely to be assumed that the Spanish commander would allow his lines at San Juan to be overwhelmed without giving them assistance, it cannot be doubted that the troops in that position received considerable reinforcements from the main lines, though to what extent such aid was sent can only be conjectured. Our forces engaged on the 1st of July numbered about 13,000 men, about 7,500 being engaged at San Juan and 5,500 at El Caney. Our losses were 1,584 killed and wounded. It is a curious fact, as illustrating the difference in the magnitude of the military operations in the two wars that, the loss of the Army of the Potomac at Fredericksburg was almost equal to the total strength of our army at San Juan-El Caney; and it is also worthy of note that the percentage of loss of the assailants in the Cuban battle was nearly as great as in the unskillful and desperate front attack made by Burnside nearly thirty-six years ago.

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It has been supposed by some ill-informed critics that the successful assault on the posi-

tion at San Juan was a refutation of the theories that have long been held in regard to a front attack upon an intrenched position. For myself, I see no reason whatever to change the opinion which I have expressed in "Organization and Tactics," p. 158, as follows:

"With the increased range and power of firearms, front attacks have become more and more difficult and costly. So true is this that unless the assailant has a great superiority in numbers or *morale*, a front attack is almost sure to fail."

In the attack in question our troops were certainly superior both in number and in *morale*. Even then the attack, though successful, was obtained at a cost of life that could have been easily avoided with more skillful tactical arrangements. Had the enemy's position been carefully ascertained beforehand, it would, I am confident, have been evident that the divisions of Kent and Wheeler should not have moved forward from their bivouacs until the issue of the engagement at El Caney was known. It is more than probable that Lawton would have been unmolested by the Spanish force in Santiago while he was engaged at El Caney, for in order to attack him the Spaniards would have been compelled to leave their intrenchments and abandon all the tactical advantages conferred by the defensive. With proper patrol-

ling and reconnaissance conducted at the time, any offensive movement by the enemy could have been promptly ascertained, the two divisions mentioned could have marched to Lawton's assistance before the Spaniards could have reached him, and they would have had the advantage of striking the enemy in the open instead of encountering him in a strong position of his own choosing. The fact that the capture of El Caney required many more hours than was originally expected makes no difference whatever in the matter. The divisions of Kent and Wheeler could have been kept in position out of fire until the capture of El Caney, even though they had not moved until the following day. With the demoralizing effect of a defeat at El Caney, and with Lawton in a position to strike their left flank, I think it may well be doubted whether the Spaniards would have made any attempt at resistance in the position at San Juan, and I believe that they would have fallen back at once to their lines in the vicinity of the city. If they had remained, it would have been so much the better for us and so much the worse for them.

But while there was nothing in the battles in Cuba to justify an alteration of the theories held generally by military men in regard to a front attack, the conduct of our troops at San Juan certainly demonstrated the fact that, con-

trary to the generally accepted opinion, it is possible for troops to make a flank march under a heavy fire of infantry. This was done at San Juan, not only when the cavalry division was marching to the right\* before the attack on Kettle Hill, but afterwards when a similar march was necessary in order to pass around the pond. It is to be noted, however, that the troops who were able to perform such a feat were troops of the highest excellence, and the execution of a flank march under heavy infantry fire is not likely to be performed as a matter of choice by any intelligent commander merely because it was shown at the battle of San Juan that such a thing might possibly be done with exceptionally fine troops.

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\* These troops were more or less concealed by trees and underbrush, and therefore not subject to well-aimed fire. In fact, it has been claimed by some that the Spaniards did not believe, until the balloon made its appearance near "Bloody Ford," that the Americans would attempt so dangerous a movement as *massing* along San Juan Creek, in easy rifle range of the Spanish trenches. It is a well-known fact that when the balloon did appear, the intensity of their fire greatly increased.

## SMOKELESS POWDER.

The Santiago campaign was the first in which our Army used smokeless powder, and, with the exception of the brief war between Greece and Turkey in 1897, it was the first in which such powder has ever been used in war. The results were interesting; not that they developed anything unforeseen, but mainly as a confirmation of views already entertained in regard to the use of the new ammunition. Four years before the Spanish War, I wrote ("Organization and Tactics," p. 187) as follows:

"The advantages of smokeless powder will probably rest with the defensive rather than the offensive. The position of the defenders was formerly outlined with smoke; and the commander acting on the offensive could thus give the assailing troops a proper direction from the beginning of the fight. This will now be much more difficult, and as a change of direction is hard to execute with troops under fire—as it is likely to cause a crowding in one place and an opening out in another part of the assailant's line, and a separation of reserves from their

proper front—more time must be taken in reconnoitering the position. This, combined with the fact that the assailant, both in reconnaissance and attack, is in full view of the defender, who can also clearly see the various objects in the assailant's path to which he has ascertained the range, manifestly gives a great advantage to the defensive. This advantage is increased by the fact that the firing-line of the defender, lying down, scarcely offers a perceptible target to the assailant, while the firing-line of the latter, although also comparatively invisible when under cover, affords a full target when it moves forward. The firing-line of the defender must, for reasons already stated, devote its attention to the firing-line of the assailants; but a second firing-line, when the nature of the position admits of employing one, may open with volleys or magazine fire on the plainly visible supports and reserves, and, by shattering them, bring the enemy's firing-line to a standstill for want of the physical and moral reinforcement necessary for its forward impulsion. The effect of smokeless powder on the *morale* of the troops is as yet an unanswered question. The killed and wounded, formerly concealed to a great degree by a merciful curtain of smoke, will now be exposed to full view, and the horrors of the battlefield may effect the nerves of the soldiers to a degree for-

merly unknown. It is more likely, however, that this will not materially affect the troops. Men never despise danger, but their pride, combativeness and excitement neutralize the instinct of self-preservation. The bewilderment produced by the atmosphere of smoke, and the sense of danger caused by losses coming from beyond a veil concealing the enemy, will no longer exist; and the men, seeing clearly, will doubtless be in less perplexity and in better heart than under the old conditions. This, combined with the fact that the men will be continually within the view of their officers, will probably render fire-discipline an easier matter than it was formerly. It seems probable, on the whole, that the introduction of smokeless powder will make the tactical handling of troops easier than it was under the old conditions; though the commander of a large force will seriously miss the indications of the progress of the combat formerly afforded by the smoke which marked the lines."

If the tense be changed in the above from the future to the past, it will answer without other alteration for a report upon the use of smokeless powder in the campaign under consideration. As to the *morale* of the men, I am

of the opinion that it had been improved instead of impaired by the introduction of smokeless powder; the absence of the bewilderment caused by smoke more than compensating for the clearer view of the casualties of battle.

## THE ARTILLERY.

Much disappointment was felt throughout the Army at the inefficiency of our artillery; for the professional qualifications of our artillery officers and the excellent training of our light batteries caused more to be expected than, as we can now see, was just. In the first place, the artillery was greatly insufficient in number. In all armies under the sun the proportion of artillery with troops in the field varies from 3 to 4½ guns per 1,000 men. In the Santiago campaign we had about 1 gun per 1,000 soldiers. The difficult nature of the country furnished very little excuse for so small a proportion of artillery. Guns can be taken to the front if those who are in command of them are determined that they shall be; and no ground is so difficult that it will not afford positions for artillery if there be a determination to find places for it. The artillery was, however, sorely handicapped in the nature of its ammunition. For the first time in history, this arm, supplied with the old black powder, was engaged with opponents provided with smokeless powder. If both sides

had been using the same antiquated ammunition, they would have been on the same equality as in past wars; but under the conditions that existed on the 1st of July, our artillery found its aim obscured, and at the same time presented a conspicuous target to its opponents by the smoke raised by its anachronistic ammunition. Smokeless powder was generally, but not exclusively, used by the Spanish artillery. One gun, at least, in the enemy's line used black powder, and with the results similar to those that generally followed the use of like ammunition by our own artillery. In the engagement on the 10th of July, this piece, which was a muzzle-loader, in position opposite the trenches occupied by the 2d Infantry, was able to fire only three shots. The fire of a considerable part of our infantry line was concentrated upon the gun, and I have been credibly informed that seven Spaniards were successively shot down in attempting to insert a single friction-primer in the vent. After the surrender, the gun is said to have been found indented and spotted with countless bullet-marks and the sponge-staff riven into splinters.

There was much dissatisfaction felt by the infantry because of the position of Dillenback's artillery in the engagements on the 10th and 11th of July. As I have already stated, Dillen-

back was about a mile in rear of the infantry, the latter being between 600 and 800 yards from the enemy's trenches. Viewed from the cold standpoint of gunnery alone, without considering any moral influences, there can be no doubt that Dillenback's position was one from which effective work could be done. The guns were within good effective range of the enemy, and it is well known that at a distance of 2,500 yards from the enemy, a battery can safely fire over its own infantry if the latter are not less than 150 or more than 2,000 yards in advance of the guns. The average infantry soldier, however, understands little about the science of gunnery, and to his mind the position of the artillery so far to the rear was merely an indication of timidity. Rather than to remain where they were, it would have been better for the batteries to advance to the infantry trenches, even though they had fired nothing but blank cartridges, for the infantry would then have felt, at least, the encouragement that is always given by the close and vigorous co-operation of the artillery. The two batteries with Lawton's division on the 10th of July were in the trenches with the infantry, and I am satisfied from my own observation that it would have been possible for the other batteries to have been similarly located. It was unfortunate that

no siege-guns were brought to bear upon the enemy's lines. Two of the siege-guns were landed at Daiquiri; the rest remained on board the transports. Why the siege artillery was not brought forward I do not know.

There was a Sims-Dudley dynamite gun, under charge of Sergeant Borrowe, accompanying the 1st Volunteer Cavalry. It is said to have done effective work on several occasions, though its fire was generally very inaccurate. Owing mainly to the delicacy of the breech mechanism, the gun frequently got out of order, causing a suspension of its fire until it could be repaired. It fired only twenty shots in the entire campaign. The only time that I personally saw this gun was on the 11th of July, and unfortunately it had then just gotten out of order, and I was unable to judge of its efficiency by personal observation. The general impression seems to be, however, that the defects of the gun can be so remedied as to make it a valuable weapon. There were also two Colt automatic guns, which seem to have been quite satisfactory, though better results might have been obtained from them had they been mounted on wheeled carriages, instead of tripods.

The campaign was a short one, and it is always dangerous to generalize from individual instances; but the battles of the 1st of July at

least demonstrated one feature in modern warfare about which there was very general doubt before—viz., the feasibility of using machine guns with the attacking columns in an assault. It had been universally conceded that such guns would be of great value on the defensive, and especially in flank positions, but there was much doubt as to the possibility of their being able to withstand fire from the opposing infantry if used in an attack at short range. That such guns can be used in a vigorous tactical offensive was clearly demonstrated, and a positive lesson in warfare in this respect was taught in the capture of the position at San Juan. It is a mistake, however, to suppose that these guns can be invariably used where the use of field artillery would be impracticable. True, our light batteries encountered infantry fire and were compelled to withdraw; while the Gatlings encountered infantry fire and were not only able to continue in action, but kept the opposing fire down. We should not forget, however, that the Gatlings were supplied with smokeless powder, and the artillery with the ammunition of a by-gone age. Had the artillery been provided with the smokeless powder and the Gatling guns with the black, a different story might have been told. I do not think there was anything in the course of these two battles that could reasonably effect any

change in the opinions long held in regard to the use of field artillery. I believe that field artillery, led with energy, courage and perseverance and supplied with smokeless powder, can still be used on the offensive as well as on the defensive, and that the effect of the modern shrapnel is so great that artillery can still easily hold its own against anything in its front.

### DISMOUNTED CAVALRY.

The operations around Santiago partook essentially of the nature of a purely infantry campaign. Wheeler's Cavalry Division bore its full share of the fighting, and no troops engaged are entitled to greater credit; but the Cavalry Division fought dismounted, and was to all intents and purposes infantry. It may perhaps be justifiable to doubt whether any other body of cavalry in the world could have performed the same work as that so well carried through by the Cavalry Division in Cuba; for the American cavalry, essentially dragoons of the highest type, had been trained with equal care in mounted and dismounted action. But though the Cavalry Division was able to do excellent work as infantry, it is to be regretted that there was not in the army of invasion a greater number of mounted troops. The officers and men of Rafferty's squadron gained just commendation for the valuable work performed by them, but the squadron was generally broken up into troops and even into squads performing escort and orderly duty. I have no hesitancy in saying,

from my own knowledge, that a force of cavalry used on reconnoitering duty would have been of inestimable value, and I am satisfied that if a single mounted troop had been with Lawton on the morning of the 23d of June, the campaign would have opened with the capture of a Spanish battalion.

## INFANTRY ORGANIZATION.

The regular infantry regiments consisted of two battalions, of four companies each (the two skeleton companies not having been filled up); the volunteers, of three similar battalions. I think the experience of the recent war has demonstrated the fact that it is unwise to have skeleton battalions in the infantry regiments, unless such battalions be in excess of the actual fighting strength desired for war. The theory upon which these skeleton battalions have been maintained in the past is, that in time of war they could be immediately filled up, and the Regular Army thus increased considerably beyond its peace footing. It seems certain, however, that whenever war breaks out, the demand for the services of the Regular Army, as the only available body of trained troops, will be so immediate, that no time will be allowed for filling out the skeleton organization; and as the Army stands in time of peace, so will it enter upon the first campaign of the war. If, however, a skeleton battalion in each regiment be maintained only for the purpose of supplying additional officers

in time of war, there can be no doubt of the wisdom of the system; for the demands for regular officers of the line for service in volunteers, both staff and line, will always be so great in time of war that unless a surplus be provided in the peace organization, the fighting efficiency of the regular regiments will be seriously crippled by the diminution of the number of officers on duty with the troops.

The tactics of the infantry was well adapted to the circumstances of the action and the nature of the terrain, and does not seem to have been characterized in any instance by a spirit of blind adherence to the drill-book. Indeed, the practical tactical training in field exercises given at most of our posts, for some years before the war, bore good fruit when our troops found themselves in actual battle. There was considerable uniformity in the tactical methods of the regular regiments. In some instances the 1st battalion was entirely deployed on the firing-line, the 2d battalion being held in reserve. In other cases the stress of circumstances caused the whole line to be deployed immediately. In every case that came under my observation, or of which I learned as a result of inquiry, the regimental reserves were all employed in the first line when the final assault began. As far as I can learn, squads were used in open-order fighting in only one

instance—viz., by the 71st New York. I am told that the noise and confusion created by the squad leaders contributed not a little towards the panic which seized that regiment. I have long been of the opinion that the squad system has more defects than advantages, and I think it would be advisable to have the Drill Regulations so revised as to admit of a simple and prompt deployment without attempting to use the squad system.

## AMMUNITION SUPPLY.

The fire-discipline of the regular regiments was excellent, and their training in field exercises and target practice was undoubtedly of inestimable value. I am informed that the expenditure of ammunition during the entire day on the 1st of July, did not exceed 100 rounds per man. The ease with which the troops were supplied with ammunition was, to my mind, one of the most remarkable things of the campaign. The subject of the supply of ammunition for the firing-line has been discussed throughout the military world for many years, and much thought and care have been devoted to the subject in all the armies of Europe. In the Santiago campaign the troops were kept supplied with ammunition by means of pack-trains which brought up the ammunition and deposited the boxes at convenient places, as close as possible to the firing-line. Men detailed for this purpose took the cartridges from these boxes and distributed them where they were needed. In fact, the solution of the vexed problem of supplying ammunition in battle

seems to be found in the words "pack-mules and courage." In supplying the troops with ammunition, the work performed by Lieutenant Cabiness (now captain), 24th Infantry, and Lieutenant William Brooke, 4th Infantry, was especially gallant and meritorious.

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The Krag-Jorgensen rifle, with which all the regular troops were armed, was found to be a thoroughly satisfactory weapon. There was at first, on the part of some of our officers, a belief that it was inferior to the Mauser; but I think this was largely due to the fact that they had seen personally the effects of the fire of the Mauser without realizing fully the destruction that had been wrought by their own weapons. The Krag-Jorgensen is simple in its action, accurate in its fire, strong and well-made, and the fact that it can be used either as a single-shooter or a magazine-gun is greatly in its favor.

**BLACK POWDER.**

The volunteer regiments, with the exception of the Rough Riders, were armed with the Springfield rifle, using black powder. The disadvantages under which they labored, from their unfortunate armament, had not been unforeseen, but had been commented upon frequently before the war began. Yet the argument had been frequently advanced that the Springfield was a much simpler rifle than the Krag-Jorgensen, and that it would consequently be a better one to place in the hands of untrained troops. The natural reply that this argument, if carried to its logical conclusion, would justify arming the volunteers with spears and clubs, as being still simpler weapons, does not always seem to have been relished by the advocates of the old rifle. Certainly those who condemned the Springfield rifle before the war found their views abundantly sustained by the experience of battle. On one occasion, on the 10th of July, I heard orders given to the 2d Massachusetts to cease firing, and this regiment remained in the line without firing a shot, because it was felt that

the target afforded by its smoke, and the annoyance caused by the same smoke to the troops on its left, were so harmful as to more than neutralize any good results that could be obtained from its fire. A practical criticism of the Springfield rifle was found in the fact that after the 1st of July no Krag-Jorgensen rifle could be left lying around unguarded without being taken by some volunteer—an act of appropriation too clearly justified by the instinct of self-preservation to be characterized as a theft. I am informed that enough spare Krag-Jorgensen rifles were available after the battle for arming a battalion of volunteers; but, for some reason unknown to me, these troops were compelled to retain the old Springfield. At least one lesson, I think, has been learned from the experience of the Santiago campaign, and it is probable that no American troops, of any kind, will ever again be deliberately sent into the field with a weapon which is known to be markedly inferior to that possessed by their opponents.

## INTRENCHING TOOLS.

It was unfortunate that each infantry soldier was not provided with a good intrenching tool. The necessity for such implements was immediate and urgent as soon as the Spanish position had been carried, and it would have been much better if the men had been provided with immediate means of making good intrenchments, instead of being compelled, while waiting for picks and shovels to be sent up from the rear, to construct hasty intrenchments with halves of canteens, pocket-knives and finger-nails. The best intrenching tool is probably the Linne-mann spade, or some modification of it. If such tools had been provided, many of them doubtless would have been thrown away before the 1st of July; but none would have been lost after that date. I was strongly impressed with the utility of the machete carried by the Cuban troops. It is not only a weapon, but a tool adapted to many diverse uses. For hewing through tropical undergrowth, cutting through barb-wire fences, for many purposes of camp use, and as a weapon, it is alike valuable. It would probably be well, especially when troops are operating in the tropics, to provide each non-commissioned officer with a machete.

### UNIFORMS.

The uniform worn by the troops in the Santiago campaign was naturally unsatisfactory, as it was one which had been adopted for a different climate. The blouse was universally discarded. The blue flannel shirt was uncomfortably warm, and was frequently worn outside of the trousers. In a few cases I noticed men carrying their trousers, evidently preferring to march bare-legged rather than endure the discomfort of wearing them. The khaki uniform was worn by many of the officers, and was also furnished to the enlisted men of the Rough Riders. It was not altogether a satisfactory uniform. It is very neat when new, but it speedily becomes dirty, and the material is not as cool as it should be. Linen uniforms would undoubtedly be more satisfactory, so far as comfort is concerned; but unless they could be frequently washed and ironed—generally impracticable in a campaign—they would become even more untidy in appearance than the khaki uniforms.

## VOLUNTEERS.

There was but one organization—viz., the 71st New York—that did not perform during the campaign the utmost that could reasonably have been expected of troops. Yet the deplorable conduct of this regiment should not excite surprise. It was composed of good material, but most of the men were raw recruits, none of them had ever seen active service, their officers were inexperienced, and suddenly finding themselves in a situation not only of great danger, but of great confusion, they behaved as raw troops generally would behave under the same circumstances. It is but just to this regiment to recall the fact that the volunteers who fled at Bull Run had at that time been in service nearly a month longer than the 71st New York had been at the time of the battle of San Juan. The 1st United States Volunteer Cavalry, generally known as the "Rough Riders," constituted a body of volunteer troops totally different from the raw levies that we can ordinarily expect in time of war. They were well armed, well officered, contained a considerable sprinkling of old

soldiers of the Regular Army, and consisted largely of men inured to hardship and trained to the use of arms. The remainder of the *personnel* consisted of young men of high social position, fond of an adventurous life, and possessing all the advantages of athletic training.

In regard to the employment of volunteers, the campaign in Cuba taught nothing that was not already known by all who were familiar with our military history. The volunteer troops, when they have become thoroughly trained, well disciplined—in brief, when they have become regulars in everything but name, are equal to any troops in existence; but raw volunteer regiments are of very little value. They do not admit of ready handling in maneuvering, and they are extremely uncertain in their action. A raw regiment *may* do well, but is more likely to break under circumstances of danger, especially where the situation is somewhat bewildering. The quality of the regular regiments was excellent. The great care which, for a number of years, had been exercised in selecting recruits, and the careful training of the men in target practice and gymnastic exercises, produced gratifying results when these regiments were called into action. One of the most notable features of the campaign was the cheerfulness of the regular troops under circumstances

of extreme discomfort, and the almost total absence of grumbling. Their gallantry in action has been frequently and justly lauded, but I do not think their cheerful and willing endurance of distressing hardships has received as much commendation as it deserves.

### STAFF AND LINE.

A comparison of the Staff and Line in the operations in Cuba has more than once been made, and quite generally to the credit of the latter. There is no doubt that the Line was in its efficiency greatly superior to the Staff; but the reasons are not far to see. The regiments of the Line were all officered with regular officers, who were performing, in the field, duties for which they had been carefully trained in time of peace. The Staff consisted of a heterogeneous aggregation of officers, some of whom had had experience in the regular staff departments in time of peace, many more who had been taken from the Line to perform duties to which they were not fully accustomed, and many others who had been commissioned from civil life outright without any special training in their staff duties, and in some instances without any military knowledge whatever. I know personally of a number of cases where newly appointed staff officers holding the rank of assistant adjutant-general, inspector-general, etc., were provided with assistants in the form of able lieuten-

ants of the regular service, who instructed them in their duties and performed the greater part of their work. It would be invidious to specify the names of such staff officers, but probably every officer who was in the campaign in Cuba well knows of such instances. It is impossible to have an efficient staff when the officers are provided in such a manner. If provision were made for a skeleton battalion for each regiment in time of peace, this battalion consisting of officers alone, it would be possible to have a certain number of line officers constantly under instruction for staff duties; and such officers could be used with the best results in time of war. Whether such officers would be selected because of their merits on the outbreak of a war may perhaps be open to reasonable doubt, but at any rate it would seem to be wise to have them available.

The lack of a thoroughly efficient staff at the several headquarters is not surprising, for not only were most of the staff officers new to the duties which they were then performing, but in no single case had the numbers of the staff been working together before. The orders for marching the different commands do not seem to have been clear and explicit; otherwise the spectacle would hardly have been seen of two divisions at the same time on a single crowded road; and

the defective intelligence transmitted to the headquarters of the Corps Commander is shown by the fact already mentioned, that two divisions were sent to await quietly, in a fire-swept zone, the result of an engagement some miles away. Very little stress seems to have been placed on any but topographical reconnaissance. The officers sent out on this duty were competent and well qualified for the performance of the task assigned to them, and the maps turned in by them were sufficient to give a clear idea of the country that they had explored. But an exploring patrol engaged in mapping a region necessarily makes slow progress, and is not sufficient for prompt reconnaissance. If there were any attempts originating at Corps Headquarters to send out small patrols for the purpose of locating the enemy or doing such "scouting" as is necessary for the prompt location of an enemy's force, regardless of cartographical details, such attempts did not come under my observation. A few patrols, ordered to push forward regardless of map-making, could have located the enemy's position at San Juan and the approaches leading to it, and could have given a reasonably clear idea to the two division commanders of the ground over which they were to operate, even though the description had been unaccompanied with a map.

### SIGNAL CORPS.

The work performed by the Signal Corps during the campaign was excellent. The Signal troops were under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel F. Green, U. S. Vols. (1st lieutenant U. S. Signal Corps), and consisted of a detachment of 35 men under command of Captain G. W. S. Stevens, U. S. Vols., charged with the duty of maintaining telegraphic and telephonic communication, and a balloon detachment of 23 men under Major J. E. Maxfield, U. S. Vols. Both Major Maxfield and Captain Stevens are officers of the Regular Army. Not only was a telegraph line promptly established from Siboney to General Shafter's headquarters, but the detachment followed on the heels of the attacking troops, and a wire was quickly established from Corps Headquarters to the headquarters of the several divisions at the front. The wire used consisted of a light rubber-covered cable, having a core of one copper and seven steel wires. This was laid over the brush or on the ground some distance back from the road, so as to secure it from being cut or broken. The work of this

detachment has been universally praised. The use made of the balloon in reconnaissance on the day of the battle has been frequently mentioned and as often censured. Its employment on the firing-line was unprecedented in war, and will probably be regarded in military history as an erratic and ill-advised exploit. Had the balloon been kept at Corps Headquarters, an observer ascending in it and using a telescope could have obtained much information that would have been transmitted immediately to the Corps Commander. It is but just to the officers of the Signal Corps to state that they were not responsible for the aeronautic eccentricity at San Juan.

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As shown in the narrative portion of this report, no use was made of the Bureau of Military Information except by detailing one of its officers as assistant adjutant-general of a brigade and permitting another to serve as a volunteer aid. There was consequently no opportunity for demonstrating the use that can be made of such a bureau. The order creating the Bureau of Military Information in the Field, at the Headquarters of the Army, is in thorough accord with the customs obtaining in European armies. Such a bureau should in no way attempt to

monopolize the reconnaissance work, nor should it interfere with duties of that description performed under the direction of corps and division commanders; but it should be required to make such special reconnaissance as might be necessary for the information of the Commanding General, should have control of the secret service, and should be charged with the shifting and collating of all information sent in to headquarters. I believe that a bureau organized as set forth in the order quoted in this report would be of great value; but the utilization of such a bureau implies a certain degree of system and intelligent organization in the military force to which it is attached.

## PACK-TRAINS.

The first assignment of field transportation to the Army was as follows: 25 wagons and 1 pack-train to each division; 5 wagons to the independent brigade; 15 wagons and 1 pack-train as ammunition-train; 1 wagon to each troop of mounted cavalry; 1 wagon to each battery, and remaining wagons and 1 pack-train as a corps train. This assignment was not, however, actually carried into effect, it being deemed advisable to limit the transportation of each division to 2 pack-trains; all the other transportation, including ambulances and 1 pack-train, being formed into a corps train immediately attached to the headquarters of the corps. This distribution probably answered the purposes of supply as well as any that could have been devised under the circumstances. The thorough efficiency of the pack-trains, which were under the charge of 1st Lieutenant A. A. Cabiness, 24th Infantry, was a matter of general comment and invariable praise. Without them the Army could not have been supplied with rations and ammunition, unless it had delayed

its advance while waiting many days for the preparation of the wagon-trains and the necessary improvement of the roads. There were eight trains in all, each consisting of 1 pack-master, 1 *cargador* (having special charge of the loading), 1 cook, 1 blacksmith, 11 packers, 50 pack-mules, 1 bell-mare, and 15 riding-mules. In ordinary "frontier" duty in our Western States, a force of 13 men constitutes a sufficient *personnel* for a pack-train; but in Cuba, owing to the density of the underbrush and the consequent difficulties of the trail, 15 men were not enough, and the packers were seriously over-worked. In tropical countries it would probably be better to employ smaller trains; each having 35 pack-mules and a *personnel* of 12 men, including packmaster, *cargador* and blacksmith. The pack-saddle used was the *aparejo*, so well known to officers who have served in our Indian campaigns, and it seems to have given the best of satisfaction. The first pack-trains were started out from Daiquiri, leaving that point in the morning and returning in the night. They were subsequently all loaded at Siboney, between which point and the front they were constantly going and coming during the military operations. After the roads had been put in a reasonable degree of repair, most of the supplies were hauled to the front in wagons.

#### TRANSPORTATION OF WOUNDED.

Owing to the insufficient number of ambulances with the Army, it was necessary to transport the wounded from the field to the hospital near the Corps headquarters, and thence to Siboney, in ordinary wagons. Much distressing and needless suffering was thus inflicted upon men who deserved better treatment; and I have no doubt that in some cases this rude means of transport was responsible for the fatal termination of wounds where recovery would otherwise have been certain. As nearly as I have been able to learn, there were only three ambulances available for the entire Army. How this happened I do not know. It certainly would seem that a sufficient number should have been on hand, for it could scarcely have been expected that Santiago would fall without at least one battle, and it could hardly have been thought that in an army of 15,000 men, the number of wounded would be so small that three ambulances would suffice for their transportation.

## MAIL SERVICE.

The lack of anything like a systematic mail service was seriously felt. The mail arrived with no regularity, and frequently after reaching Siboney it was delayed in its transit to Corps Headquarters, from which point its transmission to the officers and men in the trenches was delayed indefinitely. Even messages by cable were not promptly transmitted to those for whom they were intended. By way of illustration, I may cite the fact that a cable message to me from the Major-General Commanding the Army required two days for its transmission from Siboney to General Lawton's headquarters. The necessity for prompt and safe carrying of letters to soldiers in the field has long been recognized, and in the European armies the mail service is regulated with as much care as that which provides the troops with rations. It requires very little knowledge of human nature for a person to appreciate the cheering influence of letters from home to a soldier who is serving in the midst of hardships and danger; or to realize the depressing influence occasioned by the an-

iety of a soldier who feels that he is cut off from those who are most dear to him. It was doubtless due to the hurried nature of the expedition that many of the influences calculated to improve, or at least to sustain, the *morale* of the troops were omitted. Every soldier should regard hunger, thirst, fatigue and danger as necessary incidents in a military life, but it is depressing to him to feel that he is required to endure *unnecessary* hardships, and that his physical well-being seems to be a matter of unconcern to those in command. An apparently needless deprivation of tobacco, and the sight of wounded comrades hauled off the field in springless, jolting army wagons, when he knows that ambulances are provided by the Goverment that he serves, are likely to cause discontent on the part of the soldier, and this feeling is further increased when he finds that no care is taken to keep him in communication with home. I am fain to believe that these things were all unavoidable; but they were certainly deplorable, and care should be taken to guard against their repetition in future. But few congratulatory orders were issued, and the influence of one of the orders was anything but good upon a portion of the command that had rendered heroic service in the battle of San Juan. The order issued on the 4th day of July, congratulating the troops

upon their victory, referred mainly to the 2d Division and the Cavalry Division. The only reference to the troops of Kent's division was as follows: "In these efforts he [General Wheeler] was ably seconded by Brigadier-General Kent, with the 1st Division on the extreme left, who also captured the works on his front." The men of this division felt, whether rightly or wrongly, that the brunt of the battle had fallen upon them; that they contributed more than either of the other two divisions to win the victory. The slight mention of them in the order quoted caused, to my knowledge, a feeling of discontent and anger on the part of many officers and men of the 1st Division.

### THE ENEMY.

The defense made by the Spaniards was characterized by courage rather than skill. Taking their posts in front of Santiago, they waited in a purely passive manner for the American attack. There were many places on the road from Siboney to Santiago where a small force, acting as a rear guard, could have seriously delayed our advance, and could have caused us to pay dearly for the ground gained; but no such attempts were made. Knowing the country thoroughly, it would have been possible for the Spaniards to send out at night a number of harassing patrols to alarm our camps, to cause confusion, and to give to our men the impression that they had in front of them an alert and active enemy. It is very possible, however, that they were deterred from so doing by the fact that the country was even better known by the Cubans than themselves, and that small patrols attempting to harass our camps would have incurred great danger from the outlying force of Garcia's men. If this was the case, the Cubans undoubt-

edly contributed not a little to the security and safety of our Army.

The Spanish blockhouses were peculiar structures, the lower part consisting of stone or of wood banked up with earth about four feet, the upper portion being constructed of wood, the blockhouse affording two tiers of fire. These blockhouses were sometimes isolated, and sometimes connected by means of intrenchments. The trenches were generally narrow in profile, and the earth was, in many cases, thrown to the rear instead of being used as an embankment to the front. There was little or no slope to the trenches, owing to the tenacious nature of the soil. The intrenchments were generally short and detached, so as to make enfilade fire difficult. They were usually provided with barb-wire entanglements, although the barb-wire obstacles encountered were frequently nothing more than ordinary barb-wire fences. This campaign furnished the first instance of the employment of barb-wire as a military obstacle, though its use had been long foreseen, and the necessity of providing nippers for the purpose of cutting the wire had been set forth in tactical works authorized by the War Department. In a number of cases the mistake was made of placing the intrenchments on the actual crest instead of the

military crest of the slope. As a result, when our troops neared the enemy's works they found themselves to a certain degree protected by the ground in front. I noticed with much surprise that when our troops had taken up a position on the captured crest, the same mistake was made, in some instances, of locating the trenches on the actual crest when the military crest was some distance beyond it.

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The demoralization of the Spaniards was so great on the 3d of July, as a result of their unsuccessful battles and the loss of their fleet, that a vigorous assault at that time would probably have been entirely successful, and not very costly in life. The continued truces, however, gave them an opportunity to strengthen their positions, and, above all, to recover their lost *morale*. I do not think there was a time after Cervera's fleet left the harbor when the American Army could not have carried the place by assault; but at any time after the 4th of July it would have been at a cost of life too heavy to be incurred except as a last resort. Had Cervera's fleet remained in the harbor, it would have delayed, but could not have prevented, the capt-

ure of the city by the Army. If the enemy had been driven out of his intrenchments by assault, it would, it is true, have been impossible for the victorious troops to hold the captured position in the face of the heavy fire that would have been poured upon them from the fleet. It would have been an act of suicidal madness to attempt to oppose armored vessels armed with many rapid-fire guns in addition to their heavy batteries, with the fire of infantry aided only by a few light field-pieces, and such a contest could not have been contemplated a moment. The investment would, nevertheless, have been completed. The lines would necessarily have been much farther back from the city, and consequently would have been much more extended; but reinforcements were available, and were, in fact, on the way. A much longer delay would have been occasioned, and doubtless a heavy loss of life from disease would have been incurred; but I am satisfied that if the Spanish vessels had remained in the harbor, Santiago must have eventually fallen into the hands of the Army, and with it the hostile fleet. The blockade, by land and sea, being completed, it would have been a mere matter of starvation. Nevertheless, the departure of Cervera from the harbor removed the most formidable obstacle in the way

of our military success, and a more valuable stroke of good fortune could not have been wished for by our Army.

Respectfully submitted.

ARTHUR L. WAGNER,  
*Lieutenant-Colonel,*  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

## APPENDIX.

BOARD ON MARINE TRANSPORT REGULATIONS.

ROOM F 7, ARMY BUILDING,  
NEW YORK, October 8, 1898.

DEAR COL. WAGNER:—Replying to your note of the 5th, I take much pleasure in giving you my recollection as to the reconnaissance made by you on the afternoon of June 30. The general reconnaissance made during the morning by General Lawton and the brigade commanders of the Second Division, viz., General Chaffee, Colonel Miles, myself, and others, was with the view of developing the topographical details necessary for formulating the plans for the attack upon El Caney early the next morning, and was made as nearly complete as the time allowed, particularly in the matter of selecting a preliminary position for the artillery southeast of Caney, and the roads to be taken by General Chaffee's and my brigades for the investment of Caney on the east and west.

As you state, the general reconnaissance ended near Marianaje, as time did not permit

of further exploration. It was important, however, to determine the circumstances in the vicinity of the Ducrot House, where General Miles' brigade was to rendezvous the next day, and to which the march of my brigade, early in the morning, would be directed preliminary to moving northward across all the roads leading into Santiago from El Caney. In this respect the reconnaissance made by you was of the greatest value, as it developed the fact that the Spaniards had withdrawn from the vicinity of the Ducrot House, as was proved by your reaching the house by one road and returning by another. That evening I was glad to receive the information from you, and was much obliged for the copy of the little field plan of your reconnaissance which you were kind enough to give me, and of which I made use the next day.

In moving my brigade on the morning of the first of July, from bivouac on the road near the position occupied by Capron's Battery, I practically moved directly towards the Ducrot House, reaching the main road between Caney and Santiago in that vicinity, and then rapidly moving eastward and northward to cover all the exits from Caney. Your information enabled me to do this with the greater rapidity than I was saved the necessity for skirmishing in my front or extending reconnaissance for the

safety of my flank, and I felt secure in the movement eastward towards Caney, leaving the Ducrot House in my rear, in advance of the arrival there of General Miles' brigade, as had been intended.

If this information shall be of any value to you as part of the military record of the campaign, I shall be very glad.

I observe that General Lawton has sick leave and is on his way home, when doubtless any deficiencies in his report can be readily supplied.

With much regard,

Very truly yours,

WILLIAM LUDLOW.

To Col. Arthur L. Wagner, Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C.









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